What Killed the ERA?

The Role of Entrepreneurs in the Marketplace of Ideas and Policy

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Abstract

Despite congressional passage in 1972 and a feminist resurgence, the Equal Rights Amendment fell three states short of ratification by 1982. I estimate local causal effects of predicted access to Phyllis Schlafly's CBS *Spectrum* commentaries using topographic and geochemical variation in reception. In Illinois, a one-standard-deviation increase in FM availability reduced House ERA support by 18.4 percentage points, while television availability increased speeches' similarity to Schlafly's anti-ERA corpus by 4.7 percentage points. Across five battleground states, FM availability reduced support for women's rights by 0.21 standard deviations. Mass media amplified a cultural entrepreneur's campaign, converting latent opposition into political resistance.

Keywords: Equal Rights Amendment; Phyllis Schlafly; media persuasion; cultural entrepreneurship; gender politics; legislative behavior

JEL Codes: D72, D83, L82, J16, N42, Z13

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> "The single biggest obstacle I had to overcome were the words equal rights. Who can be against equal rights?"
>
> Phyllis Schlafly, 2000 Eagle Council Training

The Equal Rights Amendment (ERA) was introduced in Congress every year from 1923 to 1972. The Republican Party platform endorsed the ERA from 1940 to 1980, and the Democratic Party platform began endorsing it in 1944. In October 1971, the ERA passed the House overwhelmingly, 354 to 24. In March 1972, it sailed through the Senate, 84 to 8. After nearly half a century stuck in committee, the amendment appeared to have become mainstream. Yet by 1982, the ERA was dead, three states short of ratification.

Historians and participants have offered competing answers for why the ERA failed. Most historians credit Phyllis Schlafly, who united the anti-ERA movement behind STOP ERA in 1972 and later reorganized it as Eagle Forum in 1975 (Critchlow 2005; Mansbridge 1986; Spruill 2017). Feminist leaders, by contrast, emphasized the insurance industry. Gloria Steinem and Eleanor Smeal argued that health insurance "stood to lose billions if the ERA forced it to stop charging women more for less coverage" and that the industry "had lobbyists in every state capital". They maintained that "Phyllis Schlafly and her antifeminist homemakers" were "brought in to cover for legislators" who were already "voting against the ERA anyway" (Steinem and Smeal 2020).[1] The ERA had potential implications for auto insurance, life insurance, and annuities that could disadvantage women (Mansbridge 1986).

Support for the ERA was wide but shallow. Many Americans could endorse equality of rights in the abstract while opposing concrete implications that opponents attached to the federal ERA: women in combat, changes to alimony and child support, publicly funded abortions, federal courts, policing, and the transfer of authority over family law from states to federal judges. The question is how an Amendment that seemed mainstream became attached to a set of concrete threats powerful enough to stop ratification. Despite decades of debate, no quantitative evidence has adjudicated between these competing accounts.

I estimate Schlafly's influence on legislative behavior and public opinion using variation in CBS reception generated by broadcast physics. TV and FM exposure vary with topographic obstruction of broadcast signals, while AM exposure varies with soil conductivity, which I isolate using a geochemical instrument. The identifying comparison is between legislative districts and counties that differed in predicted access to Schlafly's CBS platform for physical reasons, not because of observed political demand for anti-ERA messages. I use these reception differences to test whether differential exposure shifted legislative votes, legislative language, and public sentiment. The public-opinion analysis focuses on five contested non-ratifying states—Florida, Illinois, Missouri, North Carolina, and Oklahoma—with the full rationale given in Section 1. Section 2 develops the propagation models and identification strategy.

The main empirical analysis, in Section 3, uses Illinois House debates and roll-call votes. Illinois offers the strongest test because it links CBS exposure directly to a state-legislative

[1] Gloria Steinem co-founded *Ms.* magazine in 1971. Eleanor Smeal was president of the National Organization for Women (NOW) from 1977 to 1982 and again from 1985 to 1987.

outcome through which ratification was decided. A one-standard-deviation increase in CBS FM coverage within a legislative district reduced legislators' probability of voting yes on the ERA by 18.4 percentage points (pp). A one-standard-deviation increase in CBS television availability increased House speeches' semantic similarity to the complete dated PSR corpus by 4.7 pp. Illinois legislators' professional affiliation with the insurance industry has no detectable association with their ERA vote, suggestive evidence contrary to the insurance lobby hypothesis.

The second analysis, in Section 4, asks whether the Illinois result is mirrored in public opinion across the five pivotal states. I treat the ANES estimates as corroborating evidence rather than the paper's primary causal test because the available survey waves provide limited pre-treatment leverage for a conventional pre-trends assessment. Within that constraint, counties with CBS FM availability from 1974 onward experienced a 0.21 standard deviation decline in sentiment toward women's rights, relative to unexposed counties. CBS TV and AM radio show no comparable detectable shift in women's-rights sentiment, and neither CBS TV nor radio significantly changes sentiment toward the women's liberation movement. Most racial, ideological, and affective outcomes show no detectable CBS FM movement.



Figure 1: Headline post-activation estimates. Arrows summarize reduced-form relationships, not mediation. Illinois effects are per standard deviation of exposure; the public-opinion effect is in outcome standard deviations. Stars use CRV1 cluster-t inference: $^{*}p < 0.10$, $^{**}p < 0.05$, $^{***}p < 0.01$.

Figure 1 displays the three headline relationships: the Illinois House FM voting estimate, the parallel FM pattern in five-state mass attitudes, and the Illinois House TV-rhetoric estimate. Full specifications and robustness checks appear below.

Section 5 traces how these arguments traveled. Schlafly did not originate the core anti-ERA claims about women in combat, alimony, child support, Social Security, insurance, bathrooms, prisons, and courts. Components had circulated for decades among liberal–labor opponents of the amendment before she redirected them toward homemakers and religious conservatives. I interpret this documented circulation and redirection as a candidate cultural match; Appendix Section 7.3 separates that interpretation from the companion theory's uncompleted formal validation. CBS later amplified an already active frame rather than creating the initial match.

The remainder of the paper proceeds as follows. Section 1 provides historical background on the ERA's path to congressional passage and Schlafly's construction of the STOP ERA campaign. Section 2 describes the exposure measures for Schlafly's CBS commentaries. Section 3 presents the main empirical evidence from Illinois legislative behavior and reports the insurance-affiliation result. Section 4 presents the supporting public-opinion evidence from the five pivotal non-ratifying states. Section 5 traces the historical origins of Schlafly's anti-ERA repertoire and develops the cultural-matching interpretation. Section 6 concludes.

1 Background

1.1 The Long Road to the ERA

The ERA is a brief document whose core text originated with suffragist Alice Paul in 1923. Paul revised the language in 1943, and that version became Section 1 of the amendment Congress passed in 1972: "Equality of rights under the law shall not be denied or abridged by the United States or by any State on account of sex."[2] To become part of the US Constitution, the federal ERA had to pass 38 out of 50 state legislatures within seven years of passing Congress.[3] By the end of 1972, 22 states had ratified the ERA, and eight more joined in 1973. Ratification then slowed sharply: between 1974 and 1977, only five additional states joined, bringing the total to 35. No additional states adopted the ERA despite congressional approval of a three-year extension. Five states even rescinded their ratification.[4]

Some states had already adopted sex-equality provisions in their constitutions or through state statute. Illinois is especially important for this paper because its 1970 Constitution states: "The equal protection of the laws shall not be denied or abridged on account of sex by the State or its units of local government and school districts" (Article I, Section 18, 1970 Illinois Constitution).[5] Illinois voters approved that constitution by a wide margin (57.3%) in 1970, but the Illinois General Assembly never ratified the federal ERA during the decade after congressional passage.[6]

Support for a state-level equal rights provision did not automatically translate into support for a federal amendment. As Mansbridge (1986) argues, a federal ERA would have shifted authority over family law from the states to federal judges. Because the federal government also controls the military, opponents could connect the federal ERA directly

[2]Paul's original 1923 text, initially named "the Lucretia Mott Amendment," read: "men and women shall have equal rights throughout the United States and every place subject to its jurisdiction." The full resolution passed by Congress added two further sections: an enforcement clause granting Congress implementation authority and a two-year effective date provision.

[3]The landmark *Coleman v. Miller* (1939) clarified that amendments to the US Constitution are pending before the states if Congress does not set a deadline. Congress's practice of seven-year deadlines, though not explicitly given in Article V, started with the 18th Amendment (1917) on prohibition. Since the 27th Amendment's ratification in 1992, despite its Congressional passage in 1789, some legal scholars argue that under a strict interpretation of Article V, an amendment becomes part of Constitution after the 38th state ratifies and that *Coleman* gave Congress the power to modify the deadline (Held, Herndon, and Stager 1997).

[4]The legal validity of rescission is unresolved as the Supreme Court dismissed the issue as moot in 1982.

[5]The semantic similarity between the Illinois and federal provision is 0.828.

[6]The Illinois General Assembly imposed a three-fifths majority threshold solely for passing the federal ERA. Illinois was the only Northern state not to ratify.

to fears of drafting women into combat. Had the federal ERA passed, it likely would not have produced either the immediate radical changes opponents feared or the short-term economic gains proponents promised, given its limitation to government action and the evolving sex-discrimination jurisprudence of the 14th Amendment and Title VII. Its primary impact would have been long-term: a constitutional symbol guiding future judicial and legislative action (Mansbridge 1986).

Despite the long campaign for passage, many Americans in 1972 were neutral or knew little about the ERA. On its face, the amendment seemed beneficial, if not innocuous. National support was roughly 57% for, 32% against, and 11% with no opinion throughout the 1970s (Mansbridge 1986). Yet state-level referendum campaigns showed that public support could collapse once opponents attached the ERA to specific legal consequences. In states where a standalone state ERA provision went to referendum, polling showed majority support before the campaign, but the actual vote went the other way.[7] These discrepancies may reflect voters changing their minds when confronted with concrete implications, or polls failing to sample the newly mobilized constituencies anti-ERA organizers had awakened. Either way, the pattern helps explain why anti-ERA organizers emphasized military service, family law, federal courts, and sex-specific benefits rather than the amendment's abstract equality language.

The gap between nominal support and concrete issue opposition matters for interpreting the ANES evidence. A broad decline in stated ERA approval is not inconsistent with high nominal support in 1976; it suggests that the amendment's meaning changed as opponents attached it to military service, family law, courts, policing, and federal power. The ANES estimand is differential movement in CBS-exposed places relative to that broader national shift.

Legal doctrine also offered other means to much of what the ERA sought to accomplish. Courts had just begun to use the 5th Amendment for federal laws and the 14th Amendment for state laws to prohibit sex discrimination by government, as they had long done for race. *Reed v. Reed* (1971), the first sex-discrimination case to use the equal protection clause of the 14th Amendment, had just been decided, and *Frontiero v. Richardson* (1973), the first to use the 5th Amendment, would soon follow. By the late 1970s, the Supreme Court had used the 14th Amendment to invalidate nearly all the discriminatory laws Congress intended the ERA to address (Mansbridge 1986). The narrowing of the ERA's practical scope raised a question legislators found increasingly difficult to dismiss: if the courts were already doing what the ERA was designed to do, what concrete benefits remained—and were they worth handing the Supreme Court new constitutional language to interpret?

Of the 15 non-ratifying states, Mansbridge (1986) characterizes ten as "Southern or Mormon," where ratification was unlikely to begin with: Alabama, Arizona, Arkansas, Georgia, Louisiana, Mississippi, Nevada, South Carolina, Utah, and Virginia. Yet even in these states, opposition was constructed rather than inevitable. Segregationists like Senator Strom Thurmond (R-South Carolina) supported the ERA in 1972, and Alabama Governor George Wallace had endorsed it in 1968. Schlafly personally lobbied both Wallace and the LDS church

[7]New York: 57% no (1975); New Jersey: 51% no (1975); Florida: 56% no (1978); Iowa: 55% no (1980); Maine: 63% no (1984) (Mansbridge 1986). Table 27 disaggregates New Jersey, Florida, Iowa, and Maine to the county level. New York remains in the aggregate summary because I have not located a public county-level returns source.

leadership to reverse their positions, and both did (Spruill 2017). Against this background, Mansbridge (1986) identifies four states where the outcome was pivotal—Florida, Illinois, North Carolina, and Oklahoma. I add Missouri, where Schlafly founded STOP ERA and recorded her CBS commentaries at KMOX St. Louis. None of these five had ratified by the 1982 deadline,[8] making them a historically motivated battleground sample rather than five arbitrary non-ratifying states. Their institutional leverage was substantial: because 35 states had ratified by that deadline, timely ratification by any three of the five would have brought the cumulative total to 38, holding other states' decisions fixed. This arithmetic establishes the battlegrounds' leverage, not Schlafly's causal contribution to any state's decision. Figure 11 maps the ratification pattern and the five selected battlegrounds. The political task, then, was not to oppose equality in the abstract but to change what the ERA meant.

1.2 Stop Taking Our Privileges (STOP) ERA

Phyllis Schlafly supplied that alternative meaning. Phyllis Schlafly (born: August 1924, died: September 2016) was a Catholic, a suburban mother of six who was active in local Republican politics and who ran unsuccessfully in Illinois for the US House in 1952 (and 1970), and the wife of a prominent St. Louis attorney (Harvard JD), Fred Schlafly. She received a BA and JD from Washington University, respectively in 1944 and 1978, and an MA in 1945 from Radcliffe College. She was a most untraditional traditional woman, one who made a career out of defending the right of women not to have one.

Schlafly's ascent to the national spotlight began during the 1964 presidential campaign, when she wrote her first self-published book, *A Choice Not An Echo*. The book sold millions of copies and helped make Barry Goldwater the Republican nominee.[9] Schlafly was a member of the John Birch Society (JBS), though she consistently denied it. In a December 1959 letter to Verne Kaub of the American Council of Christian Laymen, Schlafly wrote that she and her husband "both joined promptly after the Chicago meeting," and the February 1960 JBS Bulletin described her as "a very loyal member" (Lazar 2020).[10] She resigned from the JBS in 1964 to prevent *A Choice Not An Echo* from being associated with the organization during the Goldwater campaign. In an August 1964 letter, JBS founder Robert Welch confirmed that the decision not to promote the book through JBS bookstores was made at Schlafly's request. Even so, individual JBS members bought and distributed more than 300,000 copies in California alone (Dallek 2023; Lazar 2020).

By 1964, Schlafly had risen to First Vice President of the National Federation of Republican Women (NFRW). After Goldwater's landslide defeat, moderate and liberal Republicans, including Elly Peterson and George Romney, moved to contain her influence. In May 1967, she lost the NFRW presidency to the establishment's preferred candidate, Gladys O'Donnell, in a bitterly contested campaign. Schlafly and roughly 3,000 furious supporters walked out of the convention and launched their own conservative movement, using the *Phyllis Schlafly Report* newsletter and an Eagle Trust Fund to finance their work (Spruill 2017). Her ex-

[8] Illinois later ratified the ERA in 2018.

[9] In her book, Schlafly sold Goldwater as the only candidate who could stop the "coastal elite kingmaker" Republicans, who were suppressing true conservative voices and forcing a moderate, internationalist agenda.

[10] When asked directly about her membership in her oral history interview, Schlafly said only that she had attended "a seminar that Robert Welch spoke at in Chicago" (DePue 2011).

pertise was in foreign policy and defense, not domestic issues. The first issue of the *Phyllis Schlafly Report*, released in August 1967, criticized the proposed handover of the Panama Canal by the United States and ended with a poem decrying O'Donnell's victory in the NFRW election.

The Republican women's establishment was led by pro-business and professional women who had originally championed the ERA. Schlafly's followers, by contrast, were often traditional, religious women who felt shut out by that establishment. As Schlafly framed it, the party's liberals would not give their side anything at all—"not even the crumb of a non-paid woman's position with practically no power" (Spruill 2017). When the ERA became a national issue in 1972, Schlafly did not need to build a movement from scratch. She could redirect a network forged through persistent institutional exclusion.

Schlafly was not initially opposed to the ERA. In December 1971, friends in Connecticut invited her to debate the amendment; she demurred, saying she did not know which side she was on. Schlafly "figured [the] ERA was something between innocuous and mildly helpful." Her host insisted and sent materials for her to study. Around the same time, Shirley Spellerberg, a conservative talk-radio host in Florida and a friend of Schlafly's, urged her to examine the amendment's implications. Spellerberg later expressed deep frustration over Schlafly's initial apathy. She believed they could have stopped the amendment in Congress and regretted that she simply "couldn't get [Schlafly] to move" earlier (Spruill 2017).

Schlafly's first anti-ERA issue of the *Phyllis Schlafly Report*, published in February 1972, centered on two claims: the ERA would require drafting women and would abolish women's right to child support and alimony. In March 1972, PSR subscriber Ann Patterson called Schlafly to report that the Oklahoma legislature had paused its ERA vote after the newsletter was distributed to legislators (Critchlow 2005; DePue 2011). In September 1972, Schlafly founded STOP ERA in St. Louis, Missouri (Spruill 2017).

By the November 1972 PSR, she had expanded her arsenal. She claimed that the ERA would raise insurance premiums, lower Social Security benefits, eliminate separate sports teams and prisons, and force unisex restrooms. Schlafly cited Harvard Law professor Paul Freund, who wrote in 1971 that "A doctrinaire equality, then, is apparently the theme of the Amendment ... life insurance commissioners may not continue to approve lower life insurance premiums for women (based on greater life expectancy)" (Freund 1971).

The November 1972 PSR also sharpened Schlafly's cultural attack. She wrote that "the women's liberationists ... motive is totally radical ... hate men, marriage, and children ... out to destroy morality and the family." In the same issue, she acknowledged the professional-women case for the amendment: "It is easy to see why the business and professional women are supporting the Equal Rights Amendment ... We support you in your efforts to eliminate all injustices, and we believe this can be done through the Civil Rights Act and the Equal Employment Opportunity Act [1972]." Starting in 1973, she included a separate anti-ERA supplement in her monthly newsletter, dispensing arguments and tactics for defeating the amendment. The newsletter became Schlafly's primary weapon for attacking the ERA and coordinating with her "troops."

To lead her state-level campaigns, Schlafly personally selected STOP ERA chairwomen from overlapping contacts in the National Federation of Republican Women (NFRW), National Council of Catholic Women (NCCW), Daughters of the American Revolution (DAR),

the Goldwater campaign, and other conservative organizations. Some chairs acknowledged using John Birch Society connections to recruit supporters. Dorothy (Dot) Malone Slade, a JBS member who knew Schlafly through the NFRW, led North Carolina and invited fellow JBS members to help. Beverly Findley, a former JBS member, led Oklahoma with Ann Patterson and worked with JBS members to plan anti-ERA hearings and recruit supporters (Spruill 2017).[11]

In 1975, STOP ERA joined forces with Women Who Want to be Women (WWWW), a sister organization founded by Lottie Beth Hobbs, a Church of Christ leader from Fort Worth, Texas. WWWW mobilized fundamentalist Protestant women in the South—a constituency Schlafly's Catholic, Midwestern network could not easily reach. In Utah, a majority of 1972 legislative candidates supported the amendment regardless of party, and the LDS church president initially declined to take a position. After Schlafly met with Mormon leaders, however, church opposition hardened rapidly: a *Church News* editorial denounced the amendment, legislators withdrew their support, and ratification was easily defeated in 1974. By 1976, the LDS officially declared the ERA a "moral issue" and directed members to work actively for its defeat, generating disproportionate lobbying pressure even in states where Mormons were a small minority (Spruill 2017).

When Schlafly began her campaign in 1972, her network was largely Catholic, with some Orthodox Jewish support. Yet conservative Catholics were divided: nuns' organizations and an ad hoc group called Catholic Women for the ERA actively supported ratification, while major Catholic lay organizations, including the NCCW in which Schlafly had long been active, opposed the amendment. Ultimately, church membership, not class or education, was the strongest predictor of anti-ERA activism: 98% of anti-ERA activists claimed church membership, compared to 31–48% of pro-ERA activists (Spruill 2017). Schlafly had to construct the religious coalition against the ERA rather than inheriting a pre-existing bloc. She helped unite theologically hostile denominations around shared anxieties about gender roles, converting latent religious conservatism into coordinated political action.

Newspaper reports date Schlafly's start on *Spectrum* to June 4, 1973 and describe two radio commentaries recorded each week at KMOX and a television commentary approximately every nine days. This regular cadence—not Schlafly's sporadic guest appearances on CBS and other networks—is the exposure studied here.[12] Schlafly later recalled that from 1973 to 1978 she "would drive down to KMOX [St. Louis] and record two commentaries, which then went out all over the world on the CBS Network" (DePue 2011). On radio, *Spectrum* distributed her five-minute commentaries across CBS AM and FM affiliates. The program brought commentators from across the political spectrum to offer opinions on, or debate, controversial national issues.[13] In 1975, *Spectrum* became a standalone show, airing on both

[11]In 1977, JBS leader John F. McManus claimed having members "in leadership positions in every state where the ERA was scotched." JBS women in Utah organized against the ERA since December 1972 through a front group called HOTDOG (Humanitarians Opposed to Degrading Our Girls) (Spruill 2017).

[12]For a documented guest debate on the ERA with Michigan Representative Martha Griffiths, see *The Pantagraph*, May 3, 1973. For the announced recurring schedule, see *St. Louis Post-Dispatch*, May 29, 1973; for the reported June 4 *Spectrum* start, see *The Edwardsville Intelligencer*, May 31, 1973.

[13]My review of archived *CBS Morning News* broadcasts from 1974–75 documents *Spectrum* as a recurring 7–8 AM segment in 1974, with 14 Schlafly appearances from January through October, none explicitly about the ERA; in 1975, she appeared once as the subject of an ERA news story rather than as a commentator.

TV and radio until 1978.

2 Measuring Exposure to CBS Commentaries

To test whether availability of Schlafly's regular CBS commentaries changed public opinion and legislative behavior, I construct measures of predicted CBS TV, FM, and AM reception. The design exploits physical variation in broadcast propagation rather than observed viewing or listening. For TV and FM, the relevant variation comes from topography (Longley and Rice 1968; Olken 2009). Radio waves in the FM and TV frequency range (20 MHz to 20 GHz) are obstructed or diverted by hills, valleys, and buildings. Terrain obstructions create geographic variation in whether households can receive a station's signal, even at the same distance from the transmitter. A county on one side of a river valley may receive a strong signal from a distant tower, while a neighboring county across the valley receives weak or no signal.

I digitized TV tower parameters from the 1972-73 Television Factbook, updated as of March 30, 1972, eight days after the ERA passed the Senate. For each TV station in the US, the Factbook records the tower's geographic coordinates, height, visual and audio power, and channel (frequency). I analogously digitized CBS FM and AM radio tower parameters from the 1972 Broadcasting Yearbook, updated as of November 15, 1971. I input the TV and FM tower parameters into the Irregular Terrain Model (ITM) (Longley and Rice 1968), which predicts TV and radio signal strength in decibels-milliwatt (dBm) from each transmitter to any receiver location using the topographical elevation map between them.

The ITM operates in two modes. Point-to-point mode computes signal attenuation from the actual terrain elevation profile between a transmitter and a specific receiver, accounting for hills, valleys, and obstructions along the path. Area prediction mode instead estimates those terrain parameters statistically from a single terrain-irregularity parameter, Δh, the interdecile range of terrain elevations in the surrounding area, without requiring a specific receiver location (Hufford, Longley, and Kissick 1982).

The two ITM modes correspond to the two reception settings in this paper. For TV, I use point-to-point mode because rooftop antennas receive television signals at fixed household locations; I therefore compute the terrain profile from each TV tower to each county centroid. For FM radio, I use area prediction mode because *Spectrum*'s regular radio schedule supplied repeated programming that could reach listeners in moving vehicles. The ITM in area mode treats the car-radio receiver as randomly sited at a 2m mobile height within terrain characterized by Δh, computed over a 30 km radius (Table 32). For TV, I use a 9m rooftop receiver height and a threshold of -55 dBm for reliable VHF reception (47 CFR §73.683, 56 dBu). For FM radio, I use a threshold of -47 dBm for FM city-grade reception (47 CFR §73.315, 70 dBu).[14] I code a county as "exposed" to a given network if its centroid receives signal strength above the relevant threshold from any network-affiliated station.

AM requires a different exposure measure. At AM broadcast frequencies, wavelengths are $\sim 300m$—long enough that signals diffract around terrain and propagate as ground

[14]To convert dBu to dBm, I use the formula: $P_{\text{dBm}} = E_{\text{dB}\mu\text{V/m}} - 77.2 + G - 20\log_{10}(f_{\text{MHz}})$, which is a rearrangement of Equation 20 in Sanders 2010. I assume a frequency of 100 MHz for FM radio with G = 0 dBi (car antenna whip) and Channel 7 (174 MHz) for TV with G = 10 dBi (rooftop antenna).

waves following the Earth's curvature.[15] Topographic elevation, which identifies the TV and FM effects, is therefore not the relevant source of variation. AM signal attenuation instead depends on soil conductivity along the transmission path. I model AM propagation using the LFMF ground-wave engine (DeMinco 1986; DeMinco 1999), implementing the Millington mixed-path method over $n = 50$ path segments (Table 32). Because AM ground-wave attenuation varies gradually with soil conductivity rather than exhibiting sharp terrain-driven cutoffs, I treat AM signal strength as a continuous measure.[16]

Figure 2 summarizes why TV/FM and AM require different propagation models.



Figure 2: Wavelength scale. TV and FM wavelengths are small relative to terrain and receiver height, so elevation can block reception. AM's wavelength is much larger, so identification comes from soil conductivity rather than terrain.

2.1 Threats to the CBS Exposure Measure

Predicted CBS exposure is not randomly assigned, and three selection channels matter. First, covered and uncovered places may differ politically: urban counties may be flatter and more liberal, while mountainous rural counties may be more conservative. Second, affiliates chose tower locations, power, height, and frequency for commercial reasons that could correlate with the political geography of ERA support. Third, Schlafly's supporters and pre-existing networks may cluster in covered areas, although TV and FM infrastructure predates her campaign.

The identifying assumption is that, conditional on controls, differences in signal strength between nearby counties reflect broadcast physics rather than systematic differences in unobserved ERA attitudes. For TV and FM, the assumption is most credible when otherwise comparable counties differ because terrain blocks the path from a transmitter to one county while leaving the path to another unobstructed. Figure 3 illustrates this identifying comparison and shows why the same terrain variation does not identify AM exposure.

[15] Wavelength is $\lambda = c/f$. TV at 174 MHz has $\lambda \approx 1.7m$; FM at 100 MHz has $\lambda \approx 3m$; AM at 1 MHz has $\lambda \approx 300m$.

[16] Discretizing the AM signal causes the strong first-stage F-statistic to collapse.



Figure 3: TV/FM terrain identification. Holding distance fixed, terrain can block line-of-sight TV/FM reception in one county but not another. AM ground waves diffract around terrain, so AM is identified through soil conductivity.

Identification therefore comes from terrain-induced propagation conditional on tower parameters, not from assuming that tower placement was exogenous. Topography is fixed across geological timescales, and TV and FM infrastructure was built in the 1950s and 1960s, before Schlafly's February 1972 anti-ERA activation and later CBS platform. Tower placement followed commercial considerations such as population density and real-estate costs rather than ideological targeting.

AM exposure raises a different concern because raw soil conductivity may be endogenous to economic geography. I therefore instrument AM signal strength with a path-integrated geochemical IV. I sample SiO_2 concentration, an inert structural compound, along each propagation corridor and feed it through the LFMF engine. The term $\bar{\sigma}$ denotes the average soil-conductivity benchmark. The residual IV $= \text{LFMF}(\sigma_{\text{SiO}_2}) - \text{LFMF}(\bar{\sigma})$ subtracts the LFMF prediction under average conductivity from the prediction under SiO_2-implied conductivity along the same transmitter-receiver path. This residual captures variation in predicted AM signal strength generated by path-specific geology, holding tower locations and other propagation inputs fixed. [17] Figure 13 shows the spatial variation in ground conductivity, SiO_2 concentration, and the residualized instrument. First-stage F-statistics well exceed the modern benchmark of 104.7 across most specifications (Lee et al. 2022). Figure 4 summarizes the AM identification strategy.

I address the third concern with pre-treatment controls. To measure pre-existing conservative networks, I digitized JBS membership lists from 1964–74 and geocoded members verified as paying dues before January 1972. I create a binary indicator for whether any JBS member resided in a county or district during the pre-treatment period.[18] These lists are incomplete because members often formally resigned from membership rolls due to social stigma while maintaining informal ties (Dallek 2023). I also control for religious environ-

[17] The AM signal skin depth is about 8–18 m, meaning the signal interacts with deep subsoil and bedrock well below the agricultural plow layer (< 0.8 m). Surface SiO_2 acts as a geological tag for this deep mineralogy because the topsoil and underlying saprolite weathered from the same parent material.

[18] Appendix Table 31 describes the provenance and limitations of the JBS membership records.



Figure 4: AM identification. SiO_2 instruments AM signal strength through soil conductivity. Dashed paths show why raw conductivity is endogenous; the ruled-out path is a direct effect of SiO_2 on framing adoption.

ments receptive to Schlafly's message independent of CBS exposure, using 1971 Association of Religion Data Archives (ARDA) church membership data to calculate county-level shares evangelical Protestant, mainline Protestant, and Catholic. These controls address the concern that CBS exposure is proxying for Schlafly's pre-existing network or local religious demand, rather than broadcast access.

In the ANES public-opinion analysis, the main specifications use CBS TV, CBS FM, and CBS AM exposure. Broader ANES placebo outcomes assess whether the estimates reflect a general conservative-media shift rather than an ERA-specific response. In the Illinois legislative-behavior specifications, I add exposure to ABC, NBC, and PBS to distinguish CBS-specific effects from general television availability. Similar patterns across all networks would point to general broadcast exposure; CBS-specific differences would be consistent with, but would not by themselves identify, a distinct CBS channel.

FM/AM overlap raises one measurement issue. I separately measure CBS TV and CBS FM exposure, but the CBS FM measure may also capture CBS AM radio exposure: "the first AM-FM factory installed car radios appeared in 1963 and 1964" (Schulenberg and Shuler 2015), and many CBS FM affiliates also broadcast on AM. Because FM and AM are highly collinear, I do not estimate them jointly. I instead estimate CBS AM in parallel specifications that replace FM. The geochemical IV for AM uses soil-mineralogy variation independent of the topographic variation identifying FM, so the parallel specifications draw on distinct sources of exogenous broadcast exposure.

National discourse and cross-county diffusion may expose control counties, so the estimates identify the marginal effect of stronger local CBS availability rather than Schlafly's campaign versus no campaign. State × year fixed effects and JBS controls absorb some shared exposure, but remaining spillovers could attenuate the local contrast and create cross-county dependence. The design therefore does not identify Schlafly's total influence.

Accordingly, both studies estimate reduced-form, intent-to-treat effects of predicted signal availability, not effects conditional on actual viewing or listening. They combine direct contact with indirect channels such as local discussion, constituent pressure, newspaper cov-

erage, and Schlafly's increased visibility.[19]

3 Legislative Behavior in Illinois

Did Schlafly's CBS platform change how legislators spoke and voted on the ERA? I test this question in Illinois, using digitized ERA debates and roll-call votes from the Illinois General Assembly.

3.1 Data

Among the five pivotal states, Illinois is uniquely suited to a legislative analysis. Article IV of the 1970 Illinois Constitution mandated transcription of General Assembly sessions. Missouri has no legal requirement to record debates, while North Carolina, Florida, and Oklahoma preserve their debates in archival audio recordings that remain undigitized. Illinois is therefore the only pivotal state where I can measure both ERA votes and the language legislators used during ERA debates.[20]

I digitized ERA debate transcripts from the Illinois General Assembly for 1972–1980, covering eight sessions, and compiled legislator votes from Newspapers.com records from the *Chicago Tribune* and other newspapers.[21] The vote, speaking, and baseline text analyses use the House. The text baseline contains 281 complete-case House speeches. As a chamber-pooling robustness check, I add 120 Senate speeches for a 401-speech pooled House and Senate sample. The Senate is too small to support a precise stand-alone estimate, so this pooled check estimates a common exposure slope rather than a separate Senate effect.

For legislators who spoke during these debates, I measure behavior with two outcomes: their ERA ratification vote (binary: $0 = \text{no}$, $1 = \text{yes}$) and their speech's mean cosine similarity to every digitized Schlafly newsletter published on or before that debate date (bounded from -1 to 1). I call the latter *equally weighted speech similarity*: each speech, rather than each speech–newsletter pair, receives equal weight. The *pair-weighted speech similarity* sensitivity instead retains every dated speech–newsletter comparison while accounting for dependence among pairs from the same speech.

I digitized the Illinois legislative district maps into GIS shapefiles.[22] The legislative analysis requires one additional exposure step because Illinois legislative districts do not always align with county boundaries. To assign exposure to districts, I calculate each county's land-area share within each district, then aggregate exposure separately for TV and FM as:

[19] I do not decompose listening or viewing probability from the effect conditional on exposure, separate direct media exposure from indirect effects, or isolate amplification effects such as CBS increasing readership of the *Phyllis Schlafly Report*.

[20] Schlafly lived in Alton, Illinois, and ran for U.S. Congress twice (1952, 1970) in Illinois.

[21] The other Illinois newspapers are the Daily Calum, Daily Chronicle, Daily Herald, Decatur Daily, Dispatch, Dixon, Edwardsville Intelligencer, Herald, Herald & Review, Pantagraph, Southern Illinoisan, and News Journal.

[22] The 77th General Assembly used separate plans with 59 House districts and 58 Senate districts. Beginning with the 78th General Assembly, both chambers used one common 59-district plan. District identifiers are therefore indexed by map period and, before the change, by chamber; equal district numbers across the old plans and the common plan are not assumed to identify the same geography.

$$TV_{dnt} = \sum_{c=1}^{C_d} w_{cd} \cdot 1_{cn}(\text{TV}) \quad \text{and} \quad FM_{dnt} = \sum_{c=1}^{C_d} w_{cd} \cdot 1_{cn}(\text{FM})$$

where w_{cd} is county c's share of district d's land area, $1_{cn}(\text{TV})$ is the binary indicator for county c receiving network n's TV signal at -55 dBm, and $1_{cn}(\text{FM})$ is the indicator for receiving network n's FM signal at -47 dBm. Each aggregation produces a continuous treatment variable ranging from 0 (no coverage) to 1 (full coverage) for each district. Figure 14 shows TV and FM coverage variation by county and by each historical legislative map.

In Figure 14, 67 of 102 Illinois counties had CBS TV coverage, while only 9 of 102 counties had CBS FM coverage, based on towers as of March 1972 for television and November 1971 for radio. These dates measure predetermined network infrastructure used to predict later CBS availability; they are not dates of Schlafly content. Both her February 1972 anti-ERA activation and the June 4, 1973 start of her recurring *Spectrum* platform postdate the infrastructure inputs. The figure also displays the distinct 77th House and Senate plans and the shared 78th-and-later 59-district General Assembly plan. On the common map, 57 of 59 legislative districts had CBS TV coverage exceeding 25% of their land area at the -55 dBm threshold, while only 34 of 59 districts had CBS FM coverage exceeding 25% at the -47 dBm threshold. The substantially greater variation in CBS FM coverage across counties and districts provides the primary identifying variation for the Illinois vote analysis.

For CBS AM, I use the same area-weighted aggregation, replacing the binary exposure indicator with continuous LFMF signal strength (and its SiO_2 IV):

$$AM_{dt} = \sum_{c=1}^{C_d} w_{cd} \cdot S_c(\text{AM})$$

where $S_c(\text{AM})$ is the continuous signal strength at county c's centroid.[23] I estimate AM in parallel specifications that replace FM; the similarity table reports the full-control TV+AM IV specification alongside the baseline TV+FM specification.

Beyond the controls described in Section 2, I digitized Illinois-specific covariates for pre-existing ideology, ERA sentiment, conservative networks, and legislator characteristics. I control for pre-existing conservative ideology using official Illinois vote records from 1964, which report county-level returns and ward, suburb, and township breakdowns for Cook County. I calculate Goldwater's vote share in both the Republican primary and general election, then aggregate each measure to the district level using county land-area weights. I control for pre-existing ERA sentiment using official Illinois vote records from 1970. Districts that voted against the 1970 Illinois Constitution may have harbored latent opposition to equal-rights language. I also include whether the district contained a JBS member who paid dues before 1972 and the legislator's distance to the nearest such member. Finally, I control for legislator characteristics by digitizing biographies from Illinois Blue Books,

[23] State borders do not constrain AM propagation: every digitized CBS AM station within the distance cutoff is eligible. In Illinois, four adjacent-state stations—WMT, WAOV, WAAC, and WSON—provide the strongest modeled CBS AM signal for 16 counties.

which provide party, professional (insurance) affiliation, veteran status, religious affiliation, and gender. Table 2 reports descriptive statistics for the variables in the Illinois General Assembly study.

To measure Schlafly's rhetorical influence, I digitized all 81 *Phyllis Schlafly Report* (PSR) newsletters on the ERA from 1972–1980.[24] Seventy-five issues enter at least one dated comparison; six postdate the final recorded debate on June 18, 1980. I transform the legislative debates and the complete PSR corpus into document-level similarity scores, average all temporally eligible issue scores within each speech, and use the resulting one-row-per-speech outcome. Appendix Section 7.1 details the construction.

3.2 Cross-Sectional Specification

I estimate the effect of CBS exposure on Illinois legislative behavior with continuous district-level treatment measures for TV and FM radio. The measures account for county-level variation in predicted signal coverage within legislative districts. The specification is:

$$y_{idt} = \chi_{TV} \cdot \text{CBS TV}_{dt} + \chi_{FM} \cdot \text{CBS FM}_{dt} + \beta \cdot X_{idt} + \rho_t + \epsilon_{idt}$$

where y_{idt} is legislator i's ERA vote in district d and session t (0 = no, 1 = yes) or a speech-level similarity outcome. For speech i on date t, that outcome is $|\mathcal{P}(t)|^{-1} \sum_{p \in \mathcal{P}(t)} \cos(e_i, e_p)$, where $\mathcal{P}(t)$ contains every PSR issue published on or before the debate date and e_i and e_p are the corresponding document vectors.

The treatment variables CBS TV_{dt} and CBS FM_{dt} are district-weighted CBS signal exposures for television and FM radio, respectively. A value of 1 means the district lies entirely within CBS TV or FM coverage; a value of 0 means the district has no predicted coverage; intermediate values reflect partial geographic exposure. I include the TV and FM measures simultaneously, along with analogous measures for ABC TV, NBC TV, and PBS TV, to separate television from radio exposure and to isolate the CBS-specific effect from general media exposure. The treatment captures access to the CBS programming bundle rather than exposure to Schlafly alone.[25]

The coefficient χ_{FM} measures the effect of moving from zero CBS FM coverage to full CBS FM coverage, holding CBS TV coverage constant. The coefficient χ_{TV} measures the analogous effect for CBS TV, holding CBS FM constant. For vote outcomes, negative coefficients indicate that CBS exposure reduced ERA support. For similarity outcomes, positive coefficients indicate greater semantic proximity to the dated PSR corpus; similarity does not encode agreement with Schlafly.

I estimate AM radio in parallel specifications because CBS FM and AM are collinear. Panels B and C replace FM with continuous z-scored AM signal strength while holding the TV network controls fixed. Panel B reports AM by OLS; Panel C instruments with the SiO_2 geochemical IV.

[24]The complete digitized PSR text corpus totals 291,180 words and combines the publicly archived issues with the comprehensive *Legacy Collection 1967–2016*. Source provenance does not determine inclusion.

[25]Schlafly was one contributor to *Spectrum*, and CBS affiliates carried other commentary and programming that could also influence legislators or constituents. The timing and text evidence make Schlafly a plausible mechanism, but the design cannot separately identify her contribution from those of other CBS voices or programs.

Legislative session fixed effects, ρ_t, control for time-varying factors common to all legislators in a session. Legislator and district-level controls, X_{idt}, include JBS membership, 1971 religious composition, Goldwater vote share, 1970 Illinois Constitution vote share, and legislator characteristics. The primary clustering unit follows treatment assignment: legislators in the same historical map-period district share measured coverage, a district plan, and potential constituency shocks. I use WCR-S as the primary finite-cluster procedure because its leave-one-cluster score adjustment reduces sensitivity to unequal cluster leverage without imposing a spatial decay function. That adjustment matters here because coverage is constant within a map-period district, so the identifying variation is district-level and unevenly spread: a single district contributes as much as 17.5 percent of the residual exposure variation, and the effective number of clusters G^*—the cluster count discounted for how unequally districts contribute that variation—ranges from 10.9 to 19.0 despite 75 to 90 nominal clusters (Carter, Schnepel, and Steigerwald 2017), as Table 7 reports. Conventional cluster-robust t tests can therefore be optimistic in these specifications, which is why the wild cluster bootstrap rather than the CRV1 p-value governs the conclusions below.[26] Nearby districts may nevertheless share shocks across their borders. Table 10 therefore reports district-plus-member clustering and a 50-mile Wendland spatial adjustment. The spatial kernel is a substantively relevant alternative for smooth geographic dependence, but its kernel and bandwidth are maintained choices; I report it as sensitivity rather than treating any one dependence model as known.

The specification is cross-sectional because Schlafly began attacking the ERA in the PSR before the Illinois General Assembly began debating federal ERA ratification, leaving no clean pre-period for legislative debate or voting outcomes.[27]

3.3 Identification Threats

Illinois's flat terrain limits topographic variation, especially within Cook County, where county-level exposure and religious controls are common across many districts and historical building-height data are unavailable. Meaningful variation remains along the Mississippi, Ohio, and Wabash river valleys.[28] For both the ANES and Illinois samples, exposure is the best reachable CBS signal from any station within the distance cutoff, including out-of-state stations. The historical-district and spatial-dependence checks address correlation across nearby districts.

CBS exposure could also change who speaks, selecting the rhetoric sample in either direction. Table 4 finds no detectable speaking effects for the three major commercial TV networks or CBS FM. The full-specification AM OLS estimate is significant, but the IV estimate is not statistically distinguishable from zero, consistent with endogenous correlates

[26] The cluster key is `pre-h:`d, `pre-s:`d, or `post:`d; numeric labels are not linked across plans. I use 9,999 null-imposed Rademacher draws. WCR-C uses ordinary restricted cluster scores; WCR-S uses leave-one-cluster score adjustments (MacKinnon, Nielsen, and Webb 2023).

[27] A difference-in-differences design would require roll calls predating the campaign: the first PSR attack appeared in February 1972, by March the newsletter had reached Oklahoma legislators, who then paused their ERA vote (Section 1), and Illinois first voted in May, so roll calls preceding her CBS platform are already potentially post-treatment. For similarity the constraint is definitional: the outcome averages similarity to PSR issues published on or before the debate date, so it has no pre-PSR value.

[28] A district in western Illinois near the Mississippi bluffs receives different signal strength than one 50 miles east on the flat prairie, despite similar latitudes.

of soil conductivity. Predicted PBS availability is associated with speaking but not with House votes or similarity, so I do not interpret it as a mechanism.[29]

The last concern, specific to the similarity outcome, is reverse timing. Could later newsletters respond to legislators and mechanically raise measured similarity? The dated construction prevents that form of feedback: a speech is compared only with PSR issues dated on or before its debate date, so future issues never enter its outcome. Schlafly also began publishing anti-ERA content in February 1972, before most state legislators had taken public positions on the ERA. This ordering does not rule out broader two-way influence through public discourse already in circulation, and I therefore interpret the outcome as semantic proximity to the available PSR frame rather than a one-way transcript of persuasion.[30]

3.4 Results

Table 3 reports cross-sectional estimates for the ERA votes of Illinois legislators, who spoke on the ERA. The columns add controls progressively: column (1) is the baseline specification, column (2) adds legislator controls and legislative session fixed effects, column (3) adds district controls and legislative session fixed effects, and column (4) reports the full specification.

The main voting result is a negative CBS FM effect. Once district-level controls are included, CBS FM exposure consistently reduces ERA support in specifications (3) and (4). In the full specification, moving from no CBS FM coverage to full coverage reduces the probability of voting "yes" by 39.7 pp. The CBS TV estimate, by contrast, is −14.1 pp and not statistically distinguishable from zero. The divergence points to FM radio, which reached constituents in cars, as the broadcast channel most closely connected to ERA votes.

The other television networks enter as controls for general broadcast availability, not as mechanism tests. NBC has a positive House vote coefficient of 68.6 pp, borderline under the primary WCR-S procedure ($p = 0.049$), and a negative similarity coefficient of −0.108 that does not reject under WCR-S ($p = 0.115$). ABC and PBS vote coefficients are not statistically distinguishable from zero; their similarity coefficients are −0.203 and 0.030. I do not assign these controls a rival-content interpretation because the paper has no dated network-content corpus or independent contact assignment for them. The coefficients measure zero-to-full-coverage associations and are not directly comparable to the per-SD CBS headline effects.

Panels B and C of Table 3 report the AM results. The positive AM IV estimates in sparse columns vanish once district controls enter, consistent with soil-conductivity corridors correlating with district characteristics. The full-specification vote estimate is not detectably different from zero.

[29]Table 12 shows that women, Protestant legislators, and legislators in districts with more support for the 1970 Illinois Constitution were more likely to speak on the ERA.

[30]Issue dates are observed by month and coded to the first day. Thirty House speeches on May 1, 1975 are therefore compared with the May 1975 issue in the baseline. Changing "on or before" to strictly before the coded date leaves the estimates effectively unchanged: CBS TV 0.203 (0.053), CBS FM −0.064 (0.032), and CBS AM IV 0.071 (0.078). A more conservative rule excluding every issue from the speech's calendar month gives CBS TV 0.207 (0.054), CBS FM −0.066 (0.032), and CBS AM IV 0.068 (0.079). Both checks retain 281 speeches and 78 historical map-period district clusters.

Table 12 reports the full-control specification. Republican party affiliation (−34.4 pp) and veteran status (−19.9 pp) are both associated with significantly lower ERA support. Legislators' affiliation with the insurance industry has a positive but insignificant coefficient (6.9 pp), providing suggestive evidence against the insurance-lobby hypothesis.

Table 5 turns from votes to rhetoric using complete-corpus, equally weighted speech similarity in the House. CBS TV exposure is positive in the full specification (0.203, CRV1 SE 0.053; WCR-S $p = 0.026$). The CBS FM estimate is consistently negative but inference-sensitive (−0.064, CRV1 SE 0.032): conventional CRV1 rejects at $p = 0.049$, the 50-mile spatial adjustment rejects at $p = 0.023$, district-plus-member clustering gives $p = 0.067$, and the primary WCR-S test gives $p = 0.117$ (WCR-C $p = 0.097$). I therefore treat the House FM result as suggestive evidence of a negative rhetorical margin, not as a primary House detection. The AM OLS and IV estimates are not statistically distinguishable from zero in the full specification. Equal weighting across speeches means that a later speech does not receive more influence merely because more prior newsletters are available. [31] The 281 eligible House speeches are represented by 11,028 dated speech–newsletter comparisons before averaging; the pair count is not the regression sample size because the baseline gives each speech equal weight. As a weighting sensitivity, Table 6 retains all 11,028 pairs. The TV and FM coefficients remain similar at 0.182 and −0.063, although their WCR-S p-values rise to 0.093 and 0.142. Both weightings use the same 78 district clusters and give nearly the same CRV1 standard error, because repeated comparisons of one speech against earlier newsletters carry no independent information about that speech. Pair weighting changes the balance of the design rather than its content: the largest cluster grows from 14 observations to 610 and G^* falls from 13.8 to 11.1 for CBS TV, which widens the bootstrap reference distribution. Equally weighted speech similarity therefore remains the baseline on design grounds, not because it yields a smaller p-value.

Tables 6 and 10 also report observation-weighted common exposure slopes across the House and Senate, not separate Senate effects. The pooled CBS FM similarity estimate is −0.060 and rejects under WCR-S ($p = 0.020$), closely matching the House point estimate. Because pooling adds 120 Senate speeches and changes the sample, it corroborates the negative direction without replacing the House estimand or its primary inference.

The full-specification AM IV estimate is 0.071 (SE 0.078; wild Anderson–Rubin WCR-S $p = 0.496$), with a first-stage statistic of 238.1. AM is therefore not detectably different from zero. Because FM and AM differ in signal construction, reception quality, and unobserved take-up, the AM result neither ranks the channels nor identifies contact volume.

To interpret magnitudes, Table 11 standardizes the effects in two ways: as a one standard deviation increase in CBS coverage within a legislative district and as a change from the 10^{th} to the 90^{th} percentile of CBS coverage. The CBS FM vote effect corresponds to an 18.4 pp decline for a one standard deviation increase in CBS FM coverage, or a 39.7 pp decline when moving from the 10^{th} to the 90^{th} percentile (0% → 100%).

For similarity, a one-standard-deviation increase in House CBS TV exposure corresponds to a 4.7 pp increase; its 10th–90th gap corresponds to 12.2 pp.

[31] *CRV1* is the finite-sample corrected cluster-robust variance estimator. It permits arbitrary dependence within each geographic cluster and applies a small-sample correction; Illinois models cluster by historical map-period district and ANES models cluster by county.

Table 13 tests whether the House voting, speaking, and similarity results depend on the signal threshold. For ERA votes, CBS FM is negative across all three tiers—−39.7 pp at strong, −28.8 pp at medium, and −19.9 pp at weak. CBS TV becomes unstable as lower thresholds leave almost no uncovered districts, so those columns are not evidence of a TV effect. The similarity rows use the approved full-corpus, equally weighted speech-similarity outcome: the House CBS TV coefficient is positive at the strong and medium thresholds, whereas CBS FM is negative across all three tiers. This directional stability supports an inference-sensitive negative FM association, although the primary WCR-S test remains nonrejecting. The AM-IV similarity coefficient remains imprecise in every threshold column.

Table 8 restricts the outcomes to the 79th–81st House sessions, the first complete sessions after Schlafly's regular *Spectrum* platform began on June 4, 1973; the 77th and 78th House sessions and their three roll calls precede it. The restriction applies to the outcome sample within the same cross-sectional models and introduces no timing interaction, so I read it as an alignment check rather than a test of onset. The similarity estimate is essentially unchanged: House CBS TV moves from 0.203 to 0.208, and its WCR-S p-value rises from 0.026 to 0.081 because the restriction leaves 52 rather than 78 district clusters. The vote estimate becomes more negative: CBS FM moves from −0.397 to −0.488 and its WCR-S p-value falls from 0.015 to 0.009 despite the smaller sample. CBS FM similarity remains negative and nonrejecting (−0.055, WCR-S $p = 0.156$), and CBS TV is not statistically distinguishable from zero for votes. I nevertheless retain all eight roll calls in the primary vote specification, because the pooled estimate is the more conservative one and requires no assumption about when the platform began to matter.

As a comparison outcome that should not respond to ERA-specific messaging, I analyze House Third Reading votes on legislator compensation or work-related resources. Of seven relevant bills from 1974 to 1977, six have usable published final member-level tallies and enter the full-period analysis.[32] Each included vote is coded so that one denotes support for greater compensation or resources. Applying the session-based timing restriction used in Table 8 drops HB 2815 from the 78th House, leaving five usable roll calls in the 79th–80th Houses. Eligibility follows the ERA vote analysis: the sample is limited to House legislators who spoke at least once in an ERA debate. The resulting full-period panel contains 393 observed yes-or-no votes from 105 legislators; the timing-restricted panel contains 322 votes from 95 legislators. Table 9 reports no detectable relationship between CBS exposure and this comparison outcome in either period. In the full-period TV+FM specification, the CBS TV and CBS FM estimates are 15.9 and 15.2 pp, respectively, with WCR-S p-values of 0.600 and 0.314; in the post-regular-platform panel, the corresponding estimates are 7.3 and 11.0 pp, with WCR-S p-values of 0.825 and 0.521. The full-specification AM OLS and IV estimates are likewise not statistically distinguishable from zero. With no digitized debate text, this comparison covers roll-call behavior only.

To summarize the voting magnitude among legislators who spoke, I calculate each ob-

[32]The six included votes are HB 2815 (June 21, 1974; salary, per diem, and office allowance), HB 1665 (May 22, 1975; per diem cut; reverse-coded), HB 3098 (June 17, 1975; pension credit), HB 243 (March 10, 1977; office allowance), HB 255 (March 10, 1977; mileage), and HB 256 (March 15, 1977; per diem increase); HB 4031 (December 2, 1976; legislator salary and per diem) does not have a published final tally because it was moved to Consideration Postponed, so it could not be digitized as a member-level outcome.

served "no" voter i's contribution to the counterfactual, capped at 1.0:

$$\text{Expected Vote Difference}_i = \min\{1, |\hat{\beta}^{\text{CBS FM}}| \times \text{CBS FM}_i\}$$

and sum across those voters. For the regular-platform counterfactual, I apply the period-matched coefficient to the five roll calls that followed the platform and leave the three earlier roll calls outside that calculation. This produces a counterfactual benchmark of 29 votes among speaking legislators (99% interval $[10, 48]$), large relative to the observed session margins. Table 15 also reports the full-period coefficient applied to all eight roll calls, which gives 34; the smaller restricted total reflects three fewer roll calls rather than a weaker association, since the period-matched coefficient is the larger of the two. This calculation does not identify which legislators would have switched or the national ratification counterfactual; I report it as a magnitude benchmark.

Together, the Illinois results provide the paper's strongest evidence: CBS FM coverage predicts lower ERA support, while CBS TV predicts greater semantic proximity to the PSR corpus. The FM rhetorical association is negative but inference-sensitive, and AM is not detectably different from zero. The next section asks whether the FM voting pattern is also visible in pivotal-state public opinion.

4 Public Opinion from Five Pivotal States

Did CBS availability from 1974 onward change how Americans in pivotal states viewed women's rights and the women's liberation movement? I answer this question using the biennial American National Election Studies (ANES) time-series surveys from 1970–84.

4.1 Data

I use two primary outcomes from the ANES Time Series. The first is the feeling thermometer toward the women's liberation movement (VCF0225), which rates the group from 0 (cold) to 100 (warm), with 50 neutral; I refer to it below as the women's movement thermometer.[33] Schlafly explicitly linked the ERA to the women's liberation movement, characterizing pro-ERA supporters as radicals who "hate men, marriage, and children" in her November 1972 PSR. Sentiment toward the movement therefore captures the cultural cleavage she sought to widen.

The second outcome is the equal-role scale (VCF0834), a seven-point item running from "women and men should have an equal role" (1) to "a woman's place is in the home" (7).[34] This measure captures attitudes toward the concrete domain Schlafly targeted: whether

[33]The item is top-coded such that 97–100 collapse into 97. I drop "don't know" (98) and non-response (99). The thermometer carried the "women's liberation movement" wording in 1970, 1972, 1974, 1976, 1980, and 1984; it was not fielded in 1978 or 1982 within this window. I do not use the feminist thermometer (VCF0253) because it first appears in 1988. The ERA-support question (VCF0833) is the most direct measure of stated approval, but it appears only after Schlafly's CBS platform was already in place—in 1976, 1978, and 1980—so I use it only descriptively. See the discussion of Table 29 in Section 4.4.

[34]Within the 1970–84 window, ANES fielded VCF0834 in 1972, 1974, 1976, 1978, 1980, 1982, and 1984, but not in 1970; the design therefore has one pre-treatment equal-role wave (1972). I drop NA (0) and "don't know, or haven't thought much about it" (8). Table 29 reports question-specific yearly counts.

women should participate equally in running business, industry, and government. The equal-role scale is therefore distinct from sentiment toward the women's movement as a group.

Before estimation, I rescale both outcomes to the unit interval by dividing the thermometer score by 100 and reverse-coding the 7-point equal-role scale so that higher values denote more egalitarian sentiment.[35] I then standardize each rescaled outcome to mean zero and unit variance, so the coefficients reported below are in standard deviations of the outcome. The scaling makes estimates across the two ANES outcomes comparable.

The analytic sample consists of ANES respondents observed at the county level in the five pivotal states over the 1970–84 waves in which each outcome was fielded. The sample has an important limitation: the ANES was designed for national-level inference rather than state- or county-level analysis, so statistical power is low, especially for individual-state estimates. I therefore pool observations across the pivotal states by year and include state × year fixed effects. State-by-year fixed effects absorb state-specific trends and national time trends, so identification comes from differential changes in CBS-exposed and unexposed counties within the same state over time.

For each county, I construct the CBS TV, FM, and AM exposure measures as described in Section 2. Figure 12 maps the resulting CBS TV and FM variation in the ANES sample. Beyond the controls in Section 2, I add respondent gender and religion from the ANES.

Tables 16 and 19 report descriptive statistics and balance between counties exposed and unexposed to CBS FM. CBS-FM-exposed counties are significantly more likely to have JBS members and a higher Catholic share, and significantly fewer Evangelicals and Mainline Protestants, than unexposed counties. At the respondent level, the Jewish difference is significant; Catholic and Evangelical differences have the same directional pattern but are not statistically significant. The imbalances motivate the county- and respondent-level controls used below.

4.2 Difference-in-Differences Specification

I estimate the effect of CBS TV and FM radio exposure on public opinion with a difference-in-differences design. The comparison is between counties with and without predicted CBS signal coverage, before and after Schlafly obtained a regular CBS platform. The post period begins in 1974, the first ANES survey wave after her recurring *Spectrum* platform began on June 4, 1973. The main specification is:

$$\begin{aligned} y_{ict} = {} & \gamma_{TV} \cdot D_c^{TV} \cdot Post_t + \gamma_{FM} \cdot D_c^{FM} \cdot Post_t \\ & + \delta_{TV} \cdot D_c^{TV} + \delta_{FM} \cdot D_c^{FM} + X_c'\beta + W_i'\lambda + \alpha_{s(c),t} + \varepsilon_{ict}. \end{aligned}$$

where $D_c^{TV} = 1_c^{CBS}(\text{TV})$, $D_c^{FM} = 1_c^{CBS}(\text{FM})$, and $Post_t = 1(t \geq 1974)$. The vectors X_c and W_i denote county-level and respondent-level controls, respectively, and $\alpha_{s(c),t}$ denotes state-by-year fixed effects.

The treatment variables are the interactions between baseline CBS exposure and the post-Schlafly period, $D_c^{TV} \cdot Post_t$ and $D_c^{FM} \cdot Post_t$. The uninteracted exposure indicators, D_c^{TV}

[35] The equal-role scale (y) is transformed via $\tilde{y} = \frac{7-y}{6}$, mapping the original 1 and 7 endpoints to 1 and 0, respectively. I do not collapse the thermometer into an above/below-50 indicator, and I retain every interior scale point.

and D_c^{FM}, absorb baseline level differences between counties with and without CBS coverage. The exposure indicators equal one if county c receives CBS TV signal strength of at least -55 dBm or CBS FM signal strength of at least -47 dBm, respectively. The coefficients γ_{TV} and γ_{FM} capture differential changes in sentiment in CBS TV- and CBS FM-covered counties after Schlafly's CBS platform was in place, relative to otherwise comparable counties without the corresponding coverage. Estimating both measures in the same specification separates the TV and FM margins.

For AM radio, I estimate parallel specifications that replace CBS FM exposure with a continuous, z-scored measure of CBS AM signal strength while retaining the CBS TV measure (Panels B and C of Tables 20 and 21). Many CBS FM affiliates simulcast on AM, so the FM and AM measures are highly collinear and cannot be estimated jointly. Panel B estimates the AM specification by OLS. Panel C instruments the AM exposure interaction from 1974 onward with the corresponding $SiO_2 \times Post_t$ interaction, controlling for baseline AM signal strength and baseline SiO_2. The parallel specifications test whether the AM margin independently shifted sentiment.

State-by-year fixed effects, $\alpha_{s(c),t}$, absorb shocks common to all counties in the same state and survey year, including national changes flexibly interacted with state-specific conditions. County-level controls, X_c, include JBS membership and religious composition. Respondent-level controls, W_i, include religion indicators and respondent gender. Standard errors are clustered at the county level to allow within-county dependence across respondents and survey waves, including the serial correlation that can otherwise overstate precision in difference-in-differences designs (Bertrand, Duflo, and Mullainathan 2004). Because treatment operates at the county level but outcomes are measured at the individual level, the coefficients average over all respondents in treated counties.

The key identifying assumption is parallel trends: absent Schlafly's regular CBS platform, counties with and without CBS coverage within the same state would have experienced similar changes in sentiment toward women's rights and on the women's movement thermometer. ANES question availability leaves only one or two pre-treatment waves, so pre-trend evidence is limited.[36]

The design is most credible where terrain creates signal variation that is plausibly unrelated to changes in ERA attitudes.[37] Missouri, North Carolina, and Oklahoma have substantial elevation changes, river valleys, and forested regions that obstruct broadcast signals. Florida and Illinois are the two flattest states in the United States, which makes identification more challenging. The states with more diverse terrain therefore provide the strongest identifying variation, while the flatter states contribute additional observations.

[36]Table 29 reports the survey years available for each ANES outcome of primary interest. The pre-treatment support for parallel trends is therefore outcome-specific rather than uniform across all measures.

[37]For example, two rural Missouri counties with similar religious composition and JBS presence may differ in CBS exposure because one lies in the Ozark highlands while another sits in a river valley. Similarly, two rural Illinois counties with similar Goldwater vote shares, religious composition, and JBS presence may differ because one sits in a river-valley basin while another has clear line-of-sight to the St. Louis transmitter.

4.3 Results

Tables 20 and 21 report the difference-in-differences estimates for sentiment toward women's rights and on the women's movement thermometer across the five pivotal states. The columns add controls progressively: column (1) is the baseline specification, column (2) adds respondent controls and state × year fixed effects, column (3) adds county controls and state × year fixed effects, and column (4) reports the full specification.

Table 20 shows the main public-opinion result. CBS FM availability from 1974 onward reduced sentiment toward women's rights by 0.21 standard deviations in the full specification. The estimate is negative in all specifications and significant in columns (2)–(4), after state × year fixed effects absorb state-level trends. CBS TV has no detectable effect in the three specifications with state × year fixed effects, likely because CBS TV coverage reaches 90.5% of the sample (Table 16), leaving limited identifying variation. For the women's movement thermometer in Table 21, neither CBS FM nor CBS TV produces a significant effect in the full specification. Panels B and C of Tables 20 and 21 report the AM results for both outcomes; the OLS and IV AM estimates are also insignificant in the full specifications.

Appendix Table 24 applies the same finite-cluster check used in Illinois. The equal-role FM result remains at $p = 0.047$ under WCR-S and $p = 0.048$ under WCR-C; TV and weak-IV-robust AM inference remain null. The women's-movement coefficients remain null for all three media. Table 25 distinguishes pre-treatment levels from the much narrower 1970–72 change checks. Equal role and rights of the accused show no pre-treatment TV, FM, or AM rejection under the wild tests. The women's-movement TV screen is ambiguous because WCR-S and WCR-C disagree in the two-wave trend and only two counties supply untreated-TV cluster support; the main women's-movement result is null.

The contrast between the two outcomes is substantively informative. The women's-rights outcome asks whether women should have an equal role in running business, industry, and government, which is the concrete domain Schlafly targeted. Her framing cast the ERA as a threat to specific privileges rather than as a dispute over abstract equality. CBS FM reduced support for women's equal role in society without reducing warmth toward the women's movement itself, a pattern consistent with Schlafly's strategy of separating the "professional women" she claimed to support from the "women liberationists" she attacked.

Table 22 reports the control estimates from the full specification. Respondent gender is significant for women's rights (−0.112 SD), indicating that female respondents reported lower support for women's equal role than male respondents. Relative to the non-religious reference category, Evangelical (−0.540 SD), Catholic (−0.365 SD), and Mainline Protestant (−0.330 SD) respondents all showed substantially lower women's-rights sentiment. At the county level, a higher Evangelical population share reduced women's-rights sentiment, while a higher Catholic population share increased it. Having a JBS member in the county had no significant effect on women's-rights sentiment (−0.085 SD), but reduced sentiment toward the women's movement by 0.294 SD.

Table 23 tests whether the ANES results depend on the signal threshold used to define CBS exposure. For women's rights, the CBS FM effect is negative and significant at the strong and medium thresholds but vanishes at the weak threshold. The women's-movement thermometer coefficient also flips sign at the weak threshold, so I read that tier as unstable rather than as evidence of a positive effect. Lower CBS TV thresholds leave coverage

nearly universal. The AM-only sensitivity is negative for women's rights and null for the thermometer, but it does not replace the benchmark joint TV+AM specification.[38]

4.4 Other ANES Outcomes and the Schlafly Effect's Scope

Two concerns remain: specificity and scope. CBS FM coverage might proxy for general conservative media exposure rather than Schlafly's specific content. The five pivotal states were also selected because ratification was contested, which raises the possibility that the ANES effect is a pivotal-state artifact. Tables 26 and 28 address these concerns by re-estimating the difference-in-differences specification across eleven ANES outcomes and three nested samples; the cross-sectional table adds ERA support as a twelfth outcome.

A generic conservative-media explanation would predict broad movement across racial attitudes, ideological thermometers, affect toward political groups, and other conservative-coded outcomes. The estimates do not show that pattern. In the pivotal states, CBS FM × Post ($t \geq 1974$) is negative for the equal-role scale (-0.213; WCR-S $p = 0.047$), but does not reject under WCR-S for the women's-movement thermometer, abortion, aid to Black Americans, or sentiment toward the police, Black militants, civil-rights leaders, liberals, conservatives, and the military. Because the wild-bootstrap p-values are pointwise, the battery is most informative about whether the coefficients move broadly in a common ideological direction. They do not. The principal gender-role result is the equal-role estimate; rights of the accused is treated separately as a candidate bundled-content outcome below.

The one non-gender outcome with a CBS FM coefficient that rejects under WCR-S is rights of the accused, which I treat as a candidate bundled outcome rather than a mechanism test. In February 1975, Schlafly linked the ERA to policing by arguing that it elevated the "rights of criminals" above "the safety of the community" and would lower police physical standards. This courts-and-crime frame maps closely onto the ANES rights-of-accused item (VCF0832).[39] An effect through that frame should be absent in the 1974 wave and emerge from 1976. The 1976+ FM estimate is precisely negative (-0.228; WCR-S $p = 0.003$), but the 1974 estimate is also negative and imprecise (-0.167; $p = 0.340$), and the period contrast is unresolved (-0.061; $p = 0.696$). The evidence therefore establishes the later association, not its onset; Appendix Table 25 reports the estimates.

The cross-sample pattern further describes the FM estimand's geographic scope. The equal-role FM point estimate is largest in the five pivotal states (-0.213), smaller in the 14 observed non-ratifying states (-0.120), and smaller again in the 41-state lower-48 sample (-0.053). The monotonic attenuation is not an artifact of scaling the outcome separately within each sample.[40] Because the samples are nested, however, the sequence of point

[38] The strong, medium, and weak tiers define TV coverage at -55, -63, and -75 dBm and FM coverage at -47, -57, and -77 dBm, respectively. The sensitivity regressions estimate each TV/FM channel separately, which explains their slight differences from the joint benchmark. At the weak FM tier, many marginal counties enter the covered group; CBS TV exceeds 94% coverage at all three tiers. The continuous AM-IV sensitivity is estimated without the CBS TV control and is therefore not directly comparable with the joint TV+AM specification used for channel interpretation.

[39] VCF0832 is a seven-point scale anchored between protecting the rights of the accused (1) and stopping crime regardless of those rights (7), fielded 1970–1978.

[40] Table 26 standardizes each outcome separately within each displayed sample. Standardizing the equal-role outcome once using the observed lower-48 distribution instead yields estimates of -0.215, -0.125, and

estimates does not by itself establish heterogeneous treatment effects. The rights-of-accused coefficient is less geographically concentrated, appearing across the broader samples.

One plausible interpretation of the equal-role gradient is political relevance and saturation. Where anti-ERA opposition was already more entrenched, additional communication may have had less opinion left to move. In many early-ratifying states, the affirmative decision preceded Schlafly's regular CBS platform, potentially reducing the issue's institutional salience, although rescission remained possible. The five selected battlegrounds retained ratification stakes through much more of the treatment period and unresolved contestation over the amendment's concrete implications. This echoes the companion framework's demand-side intuition: an alternative is useful only to citizens whose concerns the incumbent leaves unaddressed and whom the alternative can represent. But the model formalizes compatible demand at first activation, not post-activation CBS persuasion, and ANES does not measure state-specific gaps. Accordingly, I treat the attenuation as suggestive of greater responsiveness in politically live contexts, not as a separately identified mechanism or a uniform nationwide persuasion effect.

Table 28 also illustrates why the difference-in-differences comparison matters. The adjusted cross-sectional women's-movement coefficients are positive across samples, whereas the difference-in-differences coefficients are near zero. Comparing post-1974 changes rather than adjusted levels keeps these level associations separate from the treatment-period divergence.[41]

Table 29 reports raw ANES means by baseline CBS FM exposure and survey year in the five pivotal states, with ERA approval included as a descriptive check.[42] ERA approval is high in 1976 and declines broadly thereafter; the design estimates additional local movement relative to that national shift.

Table 17 shows that stated ERA approval is most closely related to warmth toward the women's movement (Pearson $r = 0.493$) and support for women's equal role ($r = 0.377$), and less strongly related to rights of the accused ($r = 0.174$). Pearson and Spearman coefficients are nearly identical, so this ordering does not depend on treating the response scales as equally spaced. Table 18 gives the corresponding group comparison. Among respondents asked both items, ERA supporters score 0.275 points higher on the equal-role scale and 0.253 points higher on the women's-movement thermometer after accounting for state-by-wave differences. The adjusted rights-of-the-accused difference is smaller, 0.124, placing it as the broader scope outcome.

Together, the five-state ANES results align with Illinois: CBS FM is associated with less egalitarian gender-role sentiment in the pivotal-state electorate, while the broader outcome

-0.053 in the pivotal, observed non-ratifying, and lower-48 samples, respectively. In an otherwise parallel pooled model, the coefficient on the CBS FM × Post × Pivotal interaction—which compares the five pivotal states with the nine other observed non-ratifying states—is -0.239 standard deviations on the common scale (SE = 0.199; CRV1 $p = 0.233$; WCR-S $p = 0.565$; WCR-C $p = 0.424$). Thus common scaling preserves the gradient, but the pivotal-state difference is not estimated precisely.

[41] Table 27 reports a post-treatment county-level referendum check. Because those referenda supply no pre-treatment outcome, they describe geographic levels rather than the difference-in-differences estimand. A Florida-only AM IV check is positive but imprecise; comparable AM data are unavailable for the other referendum states.

[42] Exposure is held fixed using 1971–72 tower geography, so later rows index baseline coverage rather than contemporaneous affiliation.

battery offers little evidence of a generic conservative-media shift. The rights-of-accused association broadens the result's scope but does not establish a 1975 onset. The next section turns from effects to mechanism: why Schlafly's arguments resonated and how older anti-ERA claims became newly effective.

5 Economic and Historical Mechanisms

5.1 Old Arguments, New Audience

Cultural entrepreneurs who sell normative visions of society need not originate the ideas they sell. Often, they repackage existing claims for a new constituency. Schlafly's anti-ERA campaign fit this pattern. The core claims she used in 1972—women in combat, loss of alimony and child support, disruption of Social Security, and repeal of sex-specific legal protections—had circulated for nearly three decades among liberal–labor opponents of the ERA. The historical puzzle is therefore not where these arguments came from, but why they became politically effective in conservative hands.

The women's movement had been split from the beginning over how to reconcile equality and motherhood. After ratification of the Nineteenth Amendment in 1920, the movement fractured into two main camps. The first was the Women's Bureau coalition—labor unions, the National Consumers League, the YWCA, the National Council of Jewish Women, the National Council of Catholic Women, the National Council of Negro Women, and others—middle-class reformers who had fought for protective labor laws such as maximum hours, minimum wages, and night-work bans for women. They saw the ERA as a direct threat to everything they had built. The second camp was Alice Paul's National Woman's Party (NWP), a small group of wealthy, highly educated professional women who introduced the ERA in 1923 and wanted formal legal equality. The NWP initially tried to compromise by exempting labor laws from the ERA, but the Women's Bureau coalition rejected the exemption as insufficient. The NWP eventually concluded that laws applying only to women did more harm than good.

Both camps were constrained by the belief that only women could care adequately for children. The Women's Bureau coalition used that premise to justify special legal treatment for women as mothers. The NWP used the same premise to defend professional equality, but it did not resolve the child-rearing question; many members remained unmarried or ran households with paid help. Neither side could articulate a fully coherent position that addressed both equality and motherhood (Harrison 1988).

By the early 1970s, the ERA coalition had changed. Early ERA supporters included professional women who sought to eliminate protective legislation, such as night-work laws, that restricted employment. Title VII of the 1964 Civil Rights Act and two landmark cases then weakened the practical importance of those protections. *Weeks v. Southern Bell Telephone & Telegraph Company* (1967, appealed and won by NOW in 1969) and *Rosenfeld v. Southern Pacific Company* (1968, appealed and won in 1971) successfully challenged state laws restricting the weight female employees could lift on the job. The courts held that such laws violated Title VII and could not be used to create male-only jobs under a Bona Fide Occupational Qualification (BFOQ). Once courts had largely dismantled

protective legislation, many liberal and union ERA opponents who had fought to retain those protections began supporting the amendment by the late 1960s. Figure 5 summarizes the coalition reversal that made Schlafly's message politically legible in the 1970s.



Figure 5: Position flip, 1923 vs. 1972. ERA support moved from NWP/professional women to labor, unions, NOW, and feminists; opposition moved from the Women's Bureau and labor reformers to Schlafly and conservative women.

Important components of the later anti-ERA repertoire appeared together in a 1943 memorandum by Douglas Maggs, Solicitor General of the Department of Labor, prepared at the request of Women's Bureau director Mary Anderson. The Department warned that the ERA would cause women's induction into the military, changes in Social Security, upheaval in laws requiring husbands to support their families, and the repeal of protective labor legislation. The memo characterized ERA advocates as adherents of a "doctrinaire equality" that was "foreign to the spirit of Anglo-American legislation and jurisprudence." During the 1950 Senate debate over the ERA, Senator Estes Kefauver, a liberal Democrat from Tennessee, used overlapping component claims in more dramatic form: the amendment could "eliminate the crime of rape," unsettle seduction laws, and even require joint bathrooms and prisons (Harrison 1988).

Senator Carl Hayden, a Democrat from Arizona, then offered a rider, drafted with the Women's Bureau's guidance, providing that the ERA "shall not be construed to impair any rights, benefits, or exemptions conferred by law upon persons of the female sex." The maneuver let senators vote for both equal rights *and* special privileges. Alice Paul rejected the hybrid, and the ERA died. The same sequence repeated in 1953. The Hayden amendment, which promised equality and special treatment at the same time, effectively killed the ERA for the decade (Harrison 1988).

In February 1964, Emanuel Celler, a liberal Democratic congressman from New York who had introduced the Civil Rights Act in the House eight months earlier, opposed adding "sex" to Title VII with overlapping component claims later used by Schlafly: "Would male citizens be justified in insisting that women share with them the burdens of compulsory military service? What would become of traditional family relationships? What about alimony?" (Celler 1964).

Several component claims that appeared in Schlafly's first anti-ERA newsletters in 1972 had been articulated almost thirty years earlier within the liberal–labor establishment, not

the conservative movement. Two decades after the Hayden rider, Schlafly did not say she opposed equal rights. Instead, she said she favored women's existing privileges—alimony, child support, draft exemption, and sex-specific protections—that the ERA would destroy. She let legislators feel they were protecting women by opposing the ERA, just as the Hayden rider had let senators feel they were supporting women by gutting it. Figure 6 carries the chronology.



Figure 6: Predated component claims, new carrier, and new audience. Schlafly reused claims previously articulated by liberal–labor ERA opponents.

The Women's Bureau coalition directed these claims at labor unions and working-class women as threats to workplace protections; Schlafly redirected them toward homemakers and religious conservatives as threats to domestic privileges. The audience and carrier changed, and CBS entered later as an amplification technology.

5.2 Cultural Matching and Media Amplification

I interpret this documented circulation and redirection as a candidate instance of *cultural matching*. The estimates identify propagation after activation, not the mechanism connecting the inherited claims to Schlafly's new audience. Figure 9 summarizes that evidence hierarchy, while the companion theory paper develops the formal model.

The pro-ERA movement also supplied Schlafly with ammunition she did not have to manufacture. Between 1963 and 1973, a rapid wave of legal change transformed the terrain of women's rights: the Equal Pay Act, Title VII, the erosion of protective labor laws, Title IX, the Equal Employment Opportunity Act, and congressional passage of the ERA itself (Goldin 2023). These victories changed the politics of mobilization. As equality claims became more successful in law, the movement appeared more demanding, while women attached to family roles, sex-specific protections, and religious traditionalism had clearer reasons to organize against the ERA. Policy victories can therefore make an unaddressed target audience more politically available, as Figure 7 illustrates.

When the National Organization for Women (NOW), founded in 1966, argued that both parents should share child-rearing responsibility, it inherited the NWP's maximalist instinct along with its egalitarian commitments (Harrison 1988). When ERA opponents asked whether the amendment meant women in combat, the pro-ERA movement answered yes, because its ideology demanded "full equality with men, not for equality with exceptions." Feminist lawyers also argued in state courts that state ERAs required publicly funded abortions (Mansbridge 1986).



Figure 7: Illustrative coalitional narrowing after a policy victory. Moderate exit shifts the incumbent-aligned coalition and may enlarge the candidate target's overlap with the vacated region. Adapted from Goldin (2023), Figure 4.

Did Schlafly become vehemently anti-ERA in reaction to radical feminists? The timeline does not support that simple story. Schlafly showed no interest in the ERA until friends in Darien, Connecticut, prompted her in December 1971; she published her first anti-ERA *Phyllis Schlafly Report* only in February 1972. By then, Ti-Grace Atkinson, who left NOW in October 1968 to form the more radical Feminists; Shulamith Firestone, whose *Dialectic of Sex* called for abolishing the nuclear family in 1970; and Kate Millett, whose *Sexual Politics* framed marriage as a patriarchal institution in 1970, had already staked out maximalist positions. Radical feminists were useful to Schlafly not as genuine catalysts but as foils.

Schlafly's more immediate antagonists were the moderate Republican women—Elly Peterson, Gladys O'Donnell, and others in the NFRW establishment—who had blocked her from institutional power and pushed her to start her own network of conservative women in August 1967 with the *Phyllis Schlafly Report* and the Eagle Trust Fund. Schlafly could not attack those moderates directly without alienating the broader Republican base. Instead, in her November 1972 *Phyllis Schlafly Report*, she exploited radical feminist positions by sepa-

rating "professional women" from "women liberationists who want to destroy morality and family." By casting the ERA as the vehicle of radical feminism rather than the mainstream bipartisan measure it appeared to be, she made moderate women's support seem naive, gave homemakers permission to oppose the amendment and professional women permission to stay out, and positioned herself as the reasonable voice against extremism. She was not creating new anxieties; she was making politically legible previously unaddressed anxieties that the women's movement's unresolved equality-and-motherhood problem had left available for fifty years.

Despite their pivotal role in cultural change (Acemoglu and Robinson 2025; Mokyr 2017; North 1981; Schumpeter 1911; Storr 2009; Swedberg 2006), specific entrepreneurs are difficult to measure. Cultural entrepreneurship combines framing—what the entrepreneur says—with performance—how she says it. The evidence here measures framing through semantic similarity between legislators' speeches and the *Phyllis Schlafly Report*; it does not measure performance. Appendix Section 7.3 gives the broader account of first activation and later propagation.

As Schlafly put it: "Your choice of words can sell a product, an issue, or a candidate ... can mean the difference between making the sale or leaving empty-handed" (Schlafly 2000). She reframed abstract rights as concrete threats: the draft for daughters, loss of alimony and child support, lower Social Security benefits, higher life insurance premiums, and judicial protection for criminals and radicals. The positive House TV association is consistent with transmission of that frame. The inference-sensitive negative FM estimate raises avoidance as a possibility, but the design does not distinguish these mechanisms.

Independently, the historical record describes a broad but comparatively diffuse pro-ERA coalition and a concentrated opposition organized by Schlafly (Olson 1965). When asked about "the array of forces in favor of ERA in '72, '73 seemed overwhelming," Schlafly recalled that the pro-ERA side "had Congress ... Nixon, Ford and Carter ... all the governors. Some of the governors would march in demonstrations against us. They had 99 percent of the media ... Hollywood ... organized forces everywhere."

The ERA's three-state shortfall made organization and messaging potentially consequential at the margin even without a nationwide turn against equal rights. The amendment's abstract majority was vulnerable because opponents could reframe it around specific costs (Mansbridge 1986). Schlafly's campaign repeatedly used that vulnerability, presenting the ERA through concrete costs and questioning its necessity.

6 Conclusion

The strongest evidence comes from Illinois, where predicted CBS availability is linked to the roll-call votes through which ratification was decided and to floor speech. A one-standard-deviation increase in CBS FM exposure reduced House legislators' probability of voting for the ERA by 18.4 pp. A one-standard-deviation increase in CBS TV availability increased House PSR similarity by 4.7 pp; the House AM estimate is not detectably different from zero.[43] The specifications condition on pre-existing conservative networks, religious

[43]Raw coefficients, standard-deviation conversions, and 10th–90th percentile effects are reported in Table 11; finite-cluster and dependence-robust inference appears in Table 6.

composition, and legislator characteristics.

The five-state corroborating estimates align qualitatively with that legislative pattern. CBS FM availability from 1974 onward was associated with a 0.21 standard-deviation decline in sentiment toward women's rights relative to unexposed counties, with WCR-S $p = 0.047$. The equal-role point estimate attenuates in broader samples; this descriptive gradient is consistent with greater responsiveness where ratification remained politically live, but the contrast between pivotal and other observed non-ratifying states is imprecise. For rights of the accused, the strong 1976+ FM association broadens the result's scope, but the inconclusive 1974 estimate and period contrast do not establish onset.

Historically, Schlafly redirected predated liberal–labor claims toward homemakers and religious conservatives whose concerns were not organized by the incumbent debate. I interpret that documented redirection as a candidate cultural match; CBS subsequently amplified the active frame.

The application suggests a mechanism that may extend beyond the ERA. Schlafly's campaign built political machinery that outlived the amendment, leaving structural and rhetorical infrastructure for later conservative movements.[44] The dominant view treats culture as moving through broad social forces such as economic development and generational replacement. I offer a complementary account: during periods of social upheaval, cultural entrepreneurs can connect inherited arguments to unaddressed audiences at dated opportunities, and media can then propagate the active frame. The estimates show that post-activation CBS availability affected selected outcomes in exposed places; they do not identify the total national counterfactual or show that media caused the initial activation.

7 Appendix

7.1 Measuring Semantic Similarity

I use semantic similarity to measure rhetorical proximity to Schlafly's framing. I divide each speech and PSR issue into nonoverlapping chunks of at most 510 content tokens and encode each chunk with a pretrained MPNet sentence encoder (Song et al. 2020), fine-tuned for semantic similarity in the Sentence-BERT framework (Reimers and Gurevych 2019).[45] I L2-normalize each chunk vector, form a content-token-weighted mean so that a short final chunk is not overweighted, and L2-normalize the resulting document vector. I then compare the direction of the document vectors: texts pointing in more similar directions receive higher semantic-similarity scores. I average all temporally eligible issue scores within each speech. Higher values indicate that a legislator's language is semantically closer to the dated PSR corpus; every speech contributes one observation regardless of how many prior issues are available.

This encoder is useful here for two reasons. First, contextual representations distinguish

[44] Schlafly explicitly named Donald Trump as the heir to the movement she built in her final 2016 book, *The Conservative Case for Trump*. Trump eulogized Schlafly as a "truly great American patriot" and a key figure in the "America First" movement.

[45] The replication archive fixes the encoder checkpoint, tokenizer, software versions, and cached embeddings used to construct the outcome.

a word's meaning from its surrounding language: "right," for example, can mean correct, conservative, or a direction. Second, contrastive sentence-level fine-tuning places semantically similar passages near one another even when they do not share exact wording.[46] The measure can therefore detect rhetorical adoption through paraphrase rather than requiring verbatim quotation.

The Dyer example illustrates the logic. In the February 1973 PSR, Schlafly wrote that the ERA text could be read to permit "reasonable legal classifications" by sex, but that another interpretation of "equality" would require "identical" treatment and "compel the courts to interpret the new Amendment as a mandate to sweep away all statutory sex distinctions." Two months later, the staunchly pro-ERA legislator Goudyloch E. Dyer used strikingly similar language while reaching the opposite political conclusion: "A policy under the law does not mean sameness. There can still be reasonable classifications of people based on functions and capability, not just arbitrary distinctions on the basis of sex. Of course, it's not going to wipe out all of the differences based on sex." The February issue–Dyer pair has document-level semantic similarity 0.785.[47] Figure 8 shows how texts become document vectors, pass through the date gate, and yield one equally weighted outcome per speech.



Figure 8: Measuring rhetorical adoption. Length-weighted chunk embeddings are averaged and normalized; cosine similarity is 0.785 for the February 1973 PSR–Dyer pair. A speech's outcome is the unweighted mean across eligible PSR issues; Dyer's seven issues yield 0.741.

The Dyer example also shows why similarity measures framing rather than agreement: a legislator can invoke Schlafly's language while endorsing, rejecting, or qualifying it. I therefore analyze votes and similarity separately. Figure 10 shows little association under either current weighting scheme. Legacy pair-level tests appeared precise because they treated

[46] The same bi-encoder approach performs well in applications involving noisy historical text and OCR (Dell 2025).

[47] The highlighted pair is illustrative. The regression uses Dyer's seven-issue mean of 0.741; restricting the mean to issues from earlier calendar months gives 0.749.

repeated speech–newsletter comparisons as independent; once within-speech dependence is preserved, rhetoric and voting remain empirically distinct.

7.2 Limitations and Extensions

The ANES design has limited pre-treatment survey support and is therefore corroborating; broader TV/FM samples assess geographic scope, although comparable AM exposure is unavailable beyond the five states. The cross-sample attenuation survives common outcome scaling, but the contrast between pivotal and other observed non-ratifying states is imprecise. These state groups do not measure compatible gaps, and the companion framework does not itself derive heterogeneous post-activation CBS effects. Across analyses, treatment is predicted local CBS availability rather than realized listening or viewership. Future work could link signal availability to pre-activation, target-specific audience measures.

7.3 Cultural Matching Framework

The evidence supports a documented historical sequence and a candidate interpretation. Overlapping claims appear in liberal and labor sources from 1943, 1950, and 1964 before Schlafly redirected them in 1972; the coalition change, December 1971 materials, and February 1972 deployment are consistent with a new opportunity and audience match. The record does not distinguish a single lineage from synthesis, calibrate compatibility, or reconstruct the materials' full provenance and access path. I therefore treat cultural matching as an interpretation rather than a completed formal validation; the theory paper's independent-lineage/common-G assumptions apply only to its search-probability benchmark.

Appendix Table 25 shows a strong 1976+ rights-of-the-accused association but inconclusive 1974 and period-contrast estimates. The result supports the frame's substantive scope but does not establish onset. Table 1 records the pre-outcome platform hypotheses: schedule evidence implies more FM than television contact opportunities during the 1974 archive window, while within-CBS content density and AM contact remain unranked.



Figure 9: Evidence hierarchy for the candidate cultural-matching interpretation.

Table 1: Pre-Outcome Platform Hypotheses

Channel	Pre-outcome hypothesis	Evidentiary limit
CBS FM	Twice-weekly radio recordings and mobile reception imply more contact opportunities than television.	Affiliate carriage, listening, and episode content are unobserved.
CBS TV (1974 archive window)	An approximately every-nine-days schedule and fixed 1974 morning placement imply fewer contact opportunities than FM; audiovisual format makes content recognizable.	Later placement differs; content density is unranked.
CBS AM	Repeated scheduling creates potential exposure.	Historical take-up is unavailable; contact volume is unranked.

7.4 Tables & Figures



Figure 10: House ERA votes and complete-corpus PSR similarity, 1972–1980. Panel A weights each speech equally; Panel B weights each dated speech–newsletter comparison equally and uses speech-block permutation inference. Both panels use common bin edges and density scales; dashed lines mark vote-group means.



Figure 11: ERA Ratification by 1982



Figure 12: CBS Radio & TV Variation Coverage Map on ANES Sample



Figure 13: AM identification inputs. Panel (a) shows FCC M3 ground conductivity on a logarithmic scale, panel (b) USGS SiO_2 concentration, and panel (c) the residualized geochemical instrument. Stars mark CBS AM stations in the five study states; propagation also considers digitized adjacent-state stations within the cutoff.



Figure 14: Illinois network coverage by geographic unit and historical district plan. From top to bottom: counties, the 77th House plan, the 77th Senate plan, and the shared 78th-and-later 59-district General Assembly plan. ABC, CBS, NBC, PBS, and CBS FM use binary coverage criteria; CBS AM shows continuous signal strength.

Table 2: Illinois General Assembly Descriptive Statistics

	N	Mean	SD	Min	Max
Outcomes					
Vote on ERA	521	0.601	0.490	0.000	1.000
Spoke on ERA	1,424	0.198	0.399	0.000	1.000
Equally weighted speech similarity, House	281	0.575	0.118	0.158	0.843
Equally weighted speech similarity, pooled House and Senate	401	0.563	0.125	0.095	0.843
District					
1964 Goldwater %	521	61.175	6.076	44.175	70.326
1970 Constitution No %	521	42.420	16.697	12.947	81.598
JBS Member	521	0.760	0.427	0.000	1.000
Legislator distance to JBS (mi)	521	8.927	15.148	0.000	99.570
Catholic %	521	60.058	23.058	8.918	79.256
Evangelical %	521	4.900	7.240	0.993	54.078
Mainline Protestant %	521	31.489	17.359	17.295	67.398
Other Christian %	521	1.244	0.920	0.156	5.504
Legislator					
Republican	521	0.470	0.500	0	1
Female	521	0.144	0.351	0	1
Veteran	521	0.514	0.500	0	1
Catholic	521	0.342	0.475	0	1
Jewish	521	0.044	0.206	0	1
Other Christian	521	0.065	0.247	0	1
Protestant	521	0.226	0.419	0	1
Insurance Affiliation	521	0.077	0.266	0	1

Legislator reference categories: Democrat, Male, Non-Veteran, No Religion, Non-Insurance. Voting sample restricted to legislators who spoke. Similarity rows use the complete-corpus, equally weighted speech-similarity outcome; the House row is the baseline and the pooled House and Senate row is a chamber-pooling robustness check.

Table 3: Legislators' ERA Vote: Illinois House (1972–1980)

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)
Panel A: TV + FM				
CBS TV	−0.037	−0.064	−0.148	−0.141
	(0.266)	(0.260)	(0.277)	(0.255)
PBS TV	−0.161	−0.183	−0.172	−0.153
	(0.203)	(0.202)	(0.194)	(0.193)
ABC TV	0.055	0.104	−0.404	−0.341
	(0.247)	(0.260)	(0.308)	(0.309)
NBC TV	0.420	0.422	0.718***	0.686***
	(0.300)	(0.282)	(0.215)	(0.204)
CBS FM	0.200*	0.079	−0.298**	−0.397***
	(0.112)	(0.098)	(0.136)	(0.119)
Adjusted R^2	0.089	0.322	0.249	0.419
Panel B: TV + AM (OLS)				
CBS AM	−0.756***	−0.591***	−0.288	−0.317
	(0.273)	(0.209)	(0.284)	(0.252)
Panel C: TV + AM (IV)				
CBS AM	0.585***	0.424***	0.400	0.221
	(0.177)	(0.141)	(0.377)	(0.380)
First-stage F	490.1	468.2	174.5	203.5
Session FE	No	Yes	Yes	Yes
Legislator Controls[b]	No	Yes	No	Yes
District Controls[c]	No	No	Yes	Yes
Observations	521	521	521	521

[a] CRV1 standard errors are in parentheses and clustered by district.

[b] Gender, Party, Veteran Status, Religion, Insurance-affiliated

[c] 1964 Goldwater %, 1970 IL Constitution %, Legislator Distance to JBS Member, JBS Member (0/1), 1971 Religious composition (%)

[d] TV/FM are district area-share proportions (0–1). AM is continuous z-scored signal strength (dBm).

Notes: In the full TV+FM specification, WCR-S/WCR-C p-values are 0.015/0.010 for CBS FM and 0.750/0.666 for CBS TV. Significance stars use conventional cluster-t inference: *** $p < 0.01$, ** $p < 0.05$, * $p < 0.1$.

Table 4: Legislators' ERA Speaking Decision: Illinois House (1972–1980)

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)
Panel A: TV + FM				
CBS TV	0.000	−0.030	0.095	−0.005
	(0.083)	(0.088)	(0.116)	(0.107)
PBS TV	0.150**	0.121*	0.194***	0.179**
	(0.069)	(0.066)	(0.067)	(0.068)
ABC TV	−0.059	−0.035	−0.196**	−0.127
	(0.082)	(0.075)	(0.087)	(0.084)
NBC TV	0.014	−0.002	−0.006	0.010
	(0.088)	(0.080)	(0.104)	(0.092)
CBS FM	−0.049	−0.007	−0.129	−0.077
	(0.073)	(0.058)	(0.096)	(0.076)
Adjusted R^2	0.010	0.119	0.068	0.141
Panel B: TV + AM (OLS)				
CBS AM	−0.074	−0.140*	−0.198	−0.255**
	(0.094)	(0.083)	(0.140)	(0.100)
Panel C: TV + AM (IV)				
CBS AM	−0.009	0.006	0.150	0.082
	(0.088)	(0.083)	(0.225)	(0.189)
First-stage F	584.8	619.5	190.7	196.1
Session FE	No	Yes	Yes	Yes
Legislator Controls[b]	No	Yes	No	Yes
District Controls[c]	No	No	Yes	Yes
Observations	1,424	1,424	1,424	1,424

Notes: The outcome is whether a legislator spoke during ERA debates. The table uses the same specifications, controls, and exposure definitions as Table 3. CRV1 standard errors are in parentheses and clustered by district. In the full TV+FM specification, WCR-S/WCR-C p-values are 0.972/0.971 for CBS TV, 0.365/0.363 for CBS FM, and 0.066/0.055 for PBS. Significance stars denote *** $p < 0.01$, ** $p < 0.05$, * $p < 0.1$.

Table 5: Legislators' Equally Weighted Speech Similarity to PSR: Illinois House (1972–1980)

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)
Panel A: TV + FM				
CBS TV	0.141^{***}	0.136^{***}	0.207^{***}	0.203^{***}
	(0.037)	(0.038)	(0.044)	(0.053)
PBS TV	0.085^{**}	0.083^{**}	0.035	0.030
	(0.028)	(0.028)	(0.036)	(0.037)
ABC TV	-0.107^{***}	-0.104^{**}	-0.223^{***}	-0.203^{***}
	(0.037)	(0.041)	(0.048)	(0.049)
NBC TV	-0.069^{*}	-0.075^{*}	-0.095^{**}	-0.108^{**}
	(0.039)	(0.038)	(0.045)	(0.053)
CBS FM	-0.033^{*}	−0.025	-0.081^{***}	-0.064^{**}
	(0.019)	(0.019)	(0.028)	(0.032)
Adjusted R^2	0.254	0.276	0.312	0.322
Panel B: TV + AM (OLS)				
CBS AM	−0.028	−0.032	0.015	0.024
	(0.049)	(0.043)	(0.060)	(0.055)
Panel C: TV + AM (IV)				
CBS AM	0.079^{**}	0.081^{**}	0.090	0.071
	(0.031)	(0.033)	(0.076)	(0.078)
First-stage F	556.7	545.6	232.3	238.1
Session FE	No	Yes	Yes	Yes
Legislator Controls[b]	No	Yes	No	Yes
District Controls[c]	No	No	Yes	Yes
Speeches	281	281	281	281

[b] Gender, party, veteran status, religion, and insurance affiliation.
[c] 1964 Goldwater vote share, 1970 Illinois Constitution vote share, distance to the nearest JBS member, JBS membership, and 1971 religious composition.
Notes: The outcome is each House speech's mean cosine similarity to PSR issues available by its debate date, with one observation per speech. Panels B and C retain but do not display the television controls. CRV1 standard errors cluster by historical map-period district; the first-stage statistic is the squared cluster-robust t statistic on the excluded geochemical instrument. Tables 6 and 10 report wild-cluster and alternative-dependence inference. Significance stars use conventional cluster-t inference based on the displayed CRV1 standard errors: $^{*}p < 0.10$, $^{**}p < 0.05$, $^{***}p < 0.01$.

Table 6: Finite-Cluster Inference in Illinois

Outcome	Channel	Estimate (CRV1 SE)	WCR-S p	WCR-C p	Obs. (districts)
Panel A. House					
ERA vote	CBS TV	−0.141 (0.255)	0.750	0.666	
	PBS TV	−0.153 (0.193)	0.550	0.553	521
	ABC TV	−0.341 (0.309)	0.666	0.544	(90)
	NBC TV	0.686*** (0.204)	0.049	0.026	
	CBS FM	−0.397*** (0.119)	0.015	0.010	
Equally weighted					
speech similarity	CBS TV	0.203*** (0.053)	0.026	0.015	
	PBS TV	0.030 (0.037)	0.501	0.479	281
	ABC TV	−0.203*** (0.049)	0.021	0.012	(78)
	NBC TV	−0.108** (0.053)	0.115	0.095	
	CBS FM	−0.064** (0.032)	0.117	0.097	
Pair-weighted					
speech similarity	CBS TV	0.182*** (0.054)	0.093	0.072	
	PBS TV	0.070* (0.037)	0.211	0.171	11,028
	ABC TV	−0.208*** (0.055)	0.063	0.032	(78)
	NBC TV	−0.082 (0.060)	0.349	0.330	
	CBS FM	−0.063** (0.028)	0.142	0.095	
Equally weighted speech					281
similarity, AM IV	CBS AM	0.071 (0.078)	0.496	0.478	(78)
Panel B. Pooled House and Senate					
ERA vote	CBS TV	0.095 (0.200)	0.732	0.700	
	PBS TV	−0.162 (0.147)	0.433	0.386	710
	ABC TV	−0.239 (0.191)	0.438	0.366	(120)
	NBC TV	0.535*** (0.173)	0.045	0.027	
	CBS FM	−0.329*** (0.110)	0.025	0.022	
Equally weighted					
speech similarity	CBS TV	0.084** (0.041)	0.118	0.102	
	PBS TV	−0.011 (0.027)	0.718	0.702	401
	ABC TV	−0.077* (0.039)	0.165	0.136	(105)
	NBC TV	−0.038 (0.031)	0.339	0.296	
	CBS FM	−0.060*** (0.021)	0.020	0.013	
Equally weighted speech					401
similarity, AM IV	CBS AM	0.000 (0.060)	0.999	0.999	(105)

Notes: Panel A uses House samples. Panel B is an observation-weighted House–Senate common-slope check, not a separate Senate estimate. The final column reports observations with historical map-period district clusters beneath them in parentheses. For pair-weighted rows, observations are dated speech–newsletter comparisons; otherwise they are votes or speeches. The vote sample includes members who spoke in a digitized debate. TV+FM rows come from joint network specifications; the blocks report every jointly estimated television-network coefficient plus CBS FM. Each AM-IV block retains TV controls but reports only CBS AM. CRV1 and 9,999-draw null-imposed wild tests cluster by historical map-period district; WCR-S is primary and WCR-C is the reported alternative. Pair-weighted rows contain 11,028 dated comparisons. AM-IV p-values are wild Anderson–Rubin; Table 10 reports other dependence adjustments. Significance stars use conventional cluster-t inference based on the displayed CRV1 standard errors; WCR and Anderson–Rubin p-values are reported separately: $^{*}p < 0.10$, $^{**}p < 0.05$, $^{***}p < 0.01$.

Table 7: Cluster Geometry and Effective Sample Size in Illinois

Sample	Channel	Estimate (CRV1 SE)	WCR-S p	WCR-C p	Effective clusters G^*	Max. leverage	Obs. (districts)
Panel A. ERA vote							
Ever spoke	CBS TV	−0.141 (0.255)	0.750	0.666	14.0	0.147	521 (90)
	CBS FM	−0.397*** (0.119)	0.015	0.010	19.0	0.132	
Spoke that day	CBS TV	0.170 (0.253)	0.737	0.621	10.9	0.171	278 (75)
	CBS FM	−0.361** (0.166)	0.094	0.089	17.7	0.136	
Panel B. Speech similarity							
Equally weighted	CBS TV	0.203*** (0.053)	0.026	0.015	13.8	0.119	281 (78)
	CBS FM	−0.064** (0.032)	0.117	0.097	18.5	0.129	
Pair-weighted	CBS TV	0.182*** (0.054)	0.093	0.072	11.1	0.165	11,028 (78)
	CBS FM	−0.063** (0.028)	0.142	0.095	13.0	0.175	

Notes: All rows use the full joint TV+FM specification with session fixed effects and CRV1 standard errors clustered on historical map-period district. Similarity rows use the chunked sentence-embedding outcome of Section 7.1 over the complete PSR corpus. Panel A compares legislators who spoke at any point in the debates with the roll calls they cast on a day they spoke; Panel B compares the two weightings of the same 281 speeches. $G^* = G/(1+\Gamma)$ is the effective number of clusters of Carter, Schnepel, and Steigerwald (2017), computed from cluster partial leverage after residualising the channel on all other regressors; the clusters counted are the historical map-period districts in the final column. *Max. leverage* is the largest share of residual exposure variation contributed by a single district. Panel B holds the cluster structure fixed, so G^* and maximum leverage carry that comparison; Panel A changes the observation and cluster counts, and the standard error moves with them. WCR-S is the primary null-imposed wild cluster p-value and WCR-C the sensitivity. Stars use CRV1 cluster-t inference. $^{*}p < 0.10$, $^{**}p < 0.05$, $^{***}p < 0.01$.

Table 8: Timing Restriction: Illinois House Outcomes After the Regular CBS Platform

Outcome	Channel	Estimate (CRV1 SE)	WCR-S p	WCR-C p	Obs. (districts)
Panel A. Full period, 1972–1980					
ERA vote	CBS TV	−0.141 (0.255)	0.750	0.666	521 (90)
	CBS FM	−0.397*** (0.119)	0.015	0.010	
Equally weighted speech similarity	CBS TV	0.203*** (0.053)	0.026	0.015	281 (78)
	CBS FM	−0.064** (0.032)	0.117	0.097	
Panel B. Post-regular platform, 1975–1980					
ERA vote	CBS TV	−0.109 (0.286)	0.828	0.778	396 (54)
	CBS FM	−0.488*** (0.126)	0.009	0.005	
Equally weighted speech similarity	CBS TV	0.208*** (0.061)	0.081	0.064	193 (52)
	CBS FM	−0.055* (0.029)	0.156	0.106	

Notes: Panel B restricts the outcomes to the 79th–81st House sessions, the first complete sessions after Schlafly's regular *Spectrum* platform began on June 4, 1973. Both panels estimate the same joint TV+FM cross-sectional specification with the manuscript's legislator and district controls, session fixed effects, and CRV1 standard errors clustered on historical map-period district; WCR p-values are null-imposed with 9,999 Rademacher draws. The restriction applies to the outcome sample, introduces no timing interaction, and does not test onset, and it does not bear on the dated-bundle or rights-of-the-accused results, which use a different sample and wave structure. Table 15 uses the Panel B vote coefficient. Stars use CRV1 cluster-t inference. $^{*}p < 0.10$, $^{**}p < 0.05$, $^{***}p < 0.01$.

Table 9: Timing Restriction: Legislator Compensation Votes as a Comparison Outcome

Outcome	Channel	Estimate (CRV1 SE)	WCR-S p	WCR-C p	Obs. (districts)
Panel A. Full period, 1974–1977					
Legislator compensation (OLS)	CBS TV	0.159 (0.166)	0.600	0.438	393 (55)
	CBS FM	0.152 (0.120)	0.314	0.319	
	CBS AM	0.186 (0.268)	0.617	0.606	
Legislator compensation (IV)	CBS AM	−0.246 (0.324)	0.594	0.568	393 (55)
	First-stage F	251.3			
Panel B. Post-regular platform, 1975–1977					
Legislator compensation (OLS)	CBS TV	0.073 (0.195)	0.825	0.760	322 (54)
	CBS FM	0.110 (0.132)	0.521	0.521	
	CBS AM	0.330 (0.288)	0.412	0.399	
Legislator compensation (IV)	CBS AM	−0.180 (0.347)	0.708	0.696	322 (54)
	First-stage F	249.2			

Notes: The outcome equals one when a legislator supports greater compensation or work-related resources. Absent, present, and indeterminate entries are excluded; HB 1665 is reversed so that one consistently denotes greater compensation or resources. Panel A pools the six relevant 1974–1977 bills with usable published final member-level tallies, yielding 393 binary member–roll-call observations from 105 legislators and 55 historical map-period districts. HB 4031 (December 2, 1976) was moved to Consideration Postponed without a published final tally and could not be digitized as a member-level outcome. Panel B applies the timing restriction from Table 8: dropping HB 2815 (June 21, 1974), which falls in the 78th House session, leaves 322 observations from 95 legislators across five usable votes and 54 districts. Eligibility in both panels follows the full-period House ever-speaker roster. All rows use the full legislator and district controls and session fixed effects. Within each period panel, the CBS TV and CBS FM rows come from the joint TV+FM specification, while the CBS AM OLS and IV rows replace FM with AM. CRV1 and 9,999-draw null-imposed wild tests cluster by historical map-period district; WCR-S is primary and WCR-C is the alternative. The IV rows report wild Anderson–Rubin p-values; the first-stage statistic is the squared cluster-robust t statistic on the excluded geochemical instrument. Stars use CRV1 cluster-t inference. $^{*}p < 0.10$, $^{**}p < 0.05$, $^{***}p < 0.01$.

Table 10: Alternative Dependence Adjustments in Illinois

Outcome	Channel	District + member SE [p]	50-mile spatial SE [p]
Panel A. House			
ERA vote	CBS TV	(0.271) [0.605]	(0.244) [0.565]
	CBS FM	(0.134) [0.004]	(0.096) [<0.001]
Equally weighted speech similarity	CBS TV	(0.054) [<0.001]	(0.048) [<0.001]
	CBS FM	(0.034) [0.067]	(0.028) [0.023]
Panel B. Pooled House and Senate			
ERA vote	CBS TV	(0.211) [0.653]	(0.187) [0.612]
	CBS FM	(0.121) [0.007]	(0.082) [<0.001]
Equally weighted speech similarity	CBS TV	(0.042) [0.046]	(0.040) [0.039]
	CBS FM	(0.024) [0.015]	(0.020) [0.003]

Notes: Point estimates appear in the preceding finite-cluster table; this table changes only the dependence adjustment; standard errors appear in parentheses and p-values in brackets. Panel A uses House samples, and Panel B pools House and Senate with common slopes. District+member clustering permits repeated legislators across sessions; the spatial adjustment uses district centroids and a 50-mile Wendland C2 kernel. These sensitivities supplement the primary WCR-S inference in Table 6 and do not apply to AM-IV rows.

Table 11: Exposure Variation and Scaled Illinois Effects

			Exposure distribution			Scaled effect	
Outcome/sample	Channel	N	SD	P10	P90	One-SD increase	10th-to-90th percentile
ERA vote, House							
	CBS TV	521	0.228	0.434	1.000	−0.032	−0.080
	PBS TV	521	0.352	0.110	1.000	−0.054	−0.136
	ABC TV	521	0.267	0.336	1.000	−0.091	−0.226
	NBC TV	521	0.249	0.389	1.000	0.171^{***}	0.419^{***}
	CBS FM	521	0.464	0.000	1.000	-0.184^{***}	-0.397^{***}
Speaking on ERA, House							
	CBS TV	1,424	0.248	0.366	1.000	−0.001	−0.003
	PBS TV	1,424	0.379	0.001	1.000	0.068^{**}	0.179^{**}
	ABC TV	1,424	0.277	0.332	1.000	−0.035	−0.085
	NBC TV	1,424	0.245	0.491	1.000	0.002	0.005
	CBS FM	1,424	0.465	0.000	1.000	−0.036	−0.077
Equally weighted speech similarity, House							
	CBS TV	281	0.233	0.399	1.000	0.047^{***}	0.122^{***}
	PBS TV	281	0.336	0.110	1.000	0.010	0.027
	ABC TV	281	0.275	0.336	1.000	-0.056^{***}	-0.135^{***}
	NBC TV	281	0.261	0.332	1.000	-0.028^{**}	-0.072^{**}
	CBS FM	281	0.468	0.000	1.000	-0.030^{**}	-0.064^{**}
	CBS AM IV	281	0.300	0.195	0.907	0.021	0.050
Equally weighted speech similarity, pooled House and Senate							
	CBS TV	401	0.230	0.434	1.000	0.019^{**}	0.047^{**}
	PBS TV	401	0.342	0.110	1.000	−0.004	−0.010
	ABC TV	401	0.261	0.336	1.000	-0.020^{*}	-0.051^{*}
	NBC TV	401	0.255	0.389	1.000	−0.010	−0.023
	CBS FM	401	0.467	0.000	1.000	-0.028^{***}	-0.060^{***}
	CBS AM IV	401	0.292	0.195	0.907	0.000	0.000

Notes: The final two columns scale each full-control coefficient by one exposure standard deviation and by its P90–P10 exposure gap. TV and FM use the joint TV+FM model; AM uses the joint TV+AM IV model. Rescaling leaves the underlying t statistics unchanged, and multiplying similarity effects by 100 gives pp changes. The pooled House–Senate block is a robustness check. Significance stars denote $^{*}p < 0.10$, $^{**}p < 0.05$, $^{***}p < 0.01$.

Table 12: Full-Control Specifications for Illinois House Voting, Speaking, and Similarity

	ERA vote House	Speaking on ERA House	PSR-Speech similarity House
Joint TV+FM media coefficients			
CBS TV	−0.141	−0.005	0.203***
	(0.255)	(0.107)	(0.053)
PBS TV	−0.153	0.179**	0.030
	(0.193)	(0.068)	(0.037)
ABC TV	−0.341	−0.127	−0.203***
	(0.309)	(0.084)	(0.049)
NBC TV	0.686***	0.010	−0.108**
	(0.204)	(0.092)	(0.053)
CBS FM	−0.397***	−0.077	−0.064**
	(0.119)	(0.076)	(0.032)
Pre-treatment district and network controls			
1964 Goldwater %	−0.002	−0.004	0.000
	(0.006)	(0.003)	(0.001)
1970 Constitution No %	−0.006*	−0.004***	−0.001
	(0.003)	(0.001)	(0.001)
JBS Member	−0.059	−0.033	0.034*
	(0.111)	(0.038)	(0.018)
Legislator distance to JBS (mi)	−0.001	0.000	0.000
	(0.004)	(0.002)	(0.001)
District Catholic %	0.023	0.003	0.016**
	(0.037)	(0.008)	(0.008)
District Evangelical %	0.030	0.003	0.018**
	(0.040)	(0.008)	(0.008)
District Mainline Protestant %	0.010	0.005	0.015*
	(0.040)	(0.009)	(0.008)
District Other Christian %	0.143*	−0.002	0.002
	(0.080)	(0.015)	(0.011)
Legislator controls			
Republican	−0.344***	0.002	0.023
	(0.083)	(0.030)	(0.016)
Female	0.095	0.381***	0.032*
	(0.103)	(0.072)	(0.017)
Veteran	−0.199***	0.038	0.002
	(0.069)	(0.023)	(0.014)
Insurance Industry Affiliation	0.069	−0.028	0.017
	(0.125)	(0.040)	(0.022)
Catholic	−0.151*	0.024	−0.001
	(0.079)	(0.030)	(0.020)
Jewish	0.127	0.039	0.051**
	(0.087)	(0.070)	(0.023)
Protestant	0.030	0.108**	0.008
	(0.130)	(0.045)	(0.020)
Other Christian	0.124	0.186*	−0.017
	(0.119)	(0.107)	(0.017)
Session fixed effects	Yes	Yes	Yes
Adjusted R^2	0.419	0.141	0.322
Observations	521	1,424	281
District clusters	90	118	78

Notes: Joint TV+FM full specifications with district-clustered CRV1 standard errors. Similarity averages eligible dated PSR comparisons to one observation per speech. Reference categories are Democrat, non-veteran, no religion, male, and non-insurance; district Mormon share is constant in the similarity sample. Significance stars denote $^{*}p < 0.10$, $^{**}p < 0.05$, $^{***}p < 0.01$.

Table 13: Signal-Threshold Sensitivity for Illinois House Voting, Speaking, and Similarity

	Strong[a]	Medium[b]	Weak[c]
ERA Vote			
CBS TV	−0.141	−0.670**	2.379***
	(0.255)	(0.300)	(0.774)
CBS FM	−0.397***	−0.288**	−0.199*
	(0.119)	(0.112)	(0.112)
CBS AM IV	0.221	0.191	0.365
	(0.380)	(0.390)	(0.342)
First-stage F	203.5	191.4	171.9
Observations (clusters)	521 (90)	521 (90)	521 (90)
Speaking on ERA			
CBS TV	−0.005	0.042	−0.774**
	(0.107)	(0.114)	(0.303)
CBS FM	−0.077	−0.080	−0.082
	(0.076)	(0.069)	(0.073)
CBS AM IV	0.082	0.054	0.114
	(0.189)	(0.191)	(0.221)
First-stage F	196.1	198.8	196.5
Observations (clusters)	1,424 (118)	1,424 (118)	1,424 (118)
Equally weighted speech similarity			
CBS TV	0.203***	0.271***	−0.139
	(0.053)	(0.060)	(0.134)
CBS FM	−0.064**	−0.048*	−0.074***
	(0.032)	(0.026)	(0.018)
CBS AM IV	0.071	0.038	0.049
	(0.078)	(0.081)	(0.089)
First-stage F	238.1	198.7	184.1
Observations (clusters)	281 (78)	281 (78)	281 (78)
Session FE	Yes	Yes	Yes
Legislator Controls	Yes	Yes	Yes
District Controls	Yes	Yes	Yes

[a] **Strong** TV: −55 dBm (Robust reception; aligns with High VHF Grade B, 56 dBu, 47 CFR §73.683); FM: −47 dBm (FM city grade contour, 70 dBu, 47 CFR §73.315).

[b] **Medium** TV: −63 dBm (Primary service boundary; aligns with Low VHF Grade B, 47 dBu, 47 CFR §73.683); FM: −57 dBm (FM service contour, 60 dBu, 47 CFR §73.213).

[c] **Weak** TV: −75 dBm (Fringe reception limit); FM: −77 dBm (FM co-channel interfering contour, 40 dBu, 47 CFR §73.213).

Notes: AM is a continuous z-scored measure and its definition does not change across columns. Its variation across columns reflects changes in the TV control. CRV1 standard errors in parentheses use district clusters. At the medium TV contour, only one district is below the 25% coverage cutoff in each outcome sample; at the weak contour, none is. The large, sign-changing weak-TV coefficients therefore rely on variation among nearly universally covered districts rather than a stable covered-versus-uncovered contrast. Similarity rows use one equally weighted observation per House speech and all 75 temporally eligible issues from the 81-issue digitized corpus. The threshold columns change the TV/FM coverage definitions while holding the speech sample, chunked sentence-embedding outcome, controls, and district clusters fixed. Significance stars denote *** $p < 0.01$, ** $p < 0.05$, * $p < 0.1$.

Table 14: Illinois House TV/FM Threshold Sensitivity Sample Composition

		Observations		Counties		Districts	
Channel	Threshold	Uncovered	Covered	Uncovered	Covered	Uncovered	Covered
Panel A. ERA vote							
CBS FM	**Strong (−47 dBm)**	208 (39.9%)	313 (60.1%)	93 (91.2%)	9 (8.8%)	37 (41.1%)	53 (58.9%)
	Medium (−57 dBm)	164 (31.5%)	357 (68.5%)	88 (86.3%)	14 (13.7%)	31 (34.4%)	59 (65.6%)
	Weak (−77 dBm)	85 (16.3%)	436 (83.7%)	49 (48.0%)	53 (52.0%)	14 (15.6%)	76 (84.4%)
CBS TV	**Strong (−55 dBm)**	11 (2.1%)	510 (97.9%)	35 (34.3%)	67 (65.7%)	3 (3.3%)	87 (96.7%)
	Medium (−63 dBm)	4 (0.8%)	517 (99.2%)	24 (23.5%)	78 (76.5%)	1 (1.1%)	89 (98.9%)
	Weak (−75 dBm)	0 (0.0%)	521 (100.0%)	7 (6.9%)	95 (93.1%)	0 (0.0%)	90 (100.0%)
Panel B. Speaking on the ERA							
CBS FM	**Strong (−47 dBm)**	603 (42.3%)	821 (57.7%)	93 (91.2%)	9 (8.8%)	50 (42.4%)	68 (57.6%)
	Medium (−57 dBm)	486 (34.1%)	938 (65.9%)	88 (86.3%)	14 (13.7%)	41 (34.7%)	77 (65.3%)
	Weak (−77 dBm)	228 (16.0%)	1,196 (84.0%)	49 (48.0%)	53 (52.0%)	20 (16.9%)	98 (83.1%)
CBS TV	**Strong (−55 dBm)**	48 (3.4%)	1,376 (96.6%)	35 (34.3%)	67 (65.7%)	4 (3.4%)	114 (96.6%)
	Medium (−63 dBm)	18 (1.3%)	1,406 (98.7%)	24 (23.5%)	78 (76.5%)	1 (0.8%)	117 (99.2%)
	Weak (−75 dBm)	0 (0.0%)	1,424 (100.0%)	7 (6.9%)	95 (93.1%)	0 (0.0%)	118 (100.0%)
Panel C. Equally weighted speech similarity							
CBS FM	**Strong (−47 dBm)**	116 (41.3%)	165 (58.7%)	93 (91.2%)	9 (8.8%)	30 (38.5%)	48 (61.5%)
	Medium (−57 dBm)	92 (32.7%)	189 (67.3%)	88 (86.3%)	14 (13.7%)	24 (30.8%)	54 (69.2%)
	Weak (−77 dBm)	52 (18.5%)	229 (81.5%)	49 (48.0%)	53 (52.0%)	11 (14.1%)	67 (85.9%)
CBS TV	**Strong (−55 dBm)**	7 (2.5%)	274 (97.5%)	35 (34.3%)	67 (65.7%)	2 (2.6%)	76 (97.4%)
	Medium (−63 dBm)	1 (0.4%)	280 (99.6%)	24 (23.5%)	78 (76.5%)	1 (1.3%)	77 (98.7%)
	Weak (−75 dBm)	0 (0.0%)	281 (100.0%)	7 (6.9%)	95 (93.1%)	0 (0.0%)	78 (100.0%)

Notes: Cells report uncovered and covered counts, with percentages in parentheses. Observation and district cells use the exact outcome-specific House sensitivity sample. County cells use the statewide county exposure file. "Covered" means that the threshold-specific TV or FM coverage share exceeds 25%. This split describes support only: the regressions in Table 13 retain continuous district coverage shares. The Strong tier is the primary TV/FM definition. AM is omitted because its instrumented signal measure is continuous rather than a threshold contrast.

Table 15: Expected Vote Difference Under Zero Predicted CBS FM Availability

Historical Chamber Context						**Speaker Sample**			**Expected difference [99% CI]**	
Sess.	Date	Req.	Y–N	Margin	Result	n	Y–N	Nay exp.	Full period	Post platform
77H	1972-05-16	89	73–69	-16	FAIL	22	10–12	43.7%	2 [0–4]	—
77H	1972-06-15	107	82–76	-25	FAIL	47	23–24	32.0%	3 [1–5]	—
78H	1973-04-04	107	95–72	-12	FAIL	56	29–27	48.3%	5 [1–9]	—
79H	1975-05-01	107	113–62	+6	PASS	76	50–26	44.9%	5 [1–8]	6 [2–9]
80H	1977-06-02	107	101–74	-6	FAIL	86	53–33	40.8%	5 [1–9]	7 [2–11]
80H	1978-06-07	107	101–64	-6	FAIL	80	52–28	43.8%	5 [1–9]	6 [2–10]
80H	1978-06-22	107	105–71	-2	FAIL	85	55–30	40.9%	5 [1–9]	6 [2–10]
81H	1980-06-18	107	102–71	-5	FAIL	69	41–28	34.3%	4 [1–7]	5 [2–8]
Total, 1972–1980			**772–559**	**-66**		**521**	**313–208**		**34 [8–60]**	—
Total, 1975–1980			**522–342**	**-13**		**396**	**251–145**		—	**29 [10–48]**

Notes: The expected difference sums $\min\{1, |\beta| \times \text{Exposure}_i\}$ over observed Nay speakers; the 99% interval applies the corresponding normal coefficient endpoints before summing. The full-period column uses $\beta = -0.397$ (CRV1 SE 0.119) from Table 3; the post-platform column uses $\beta = -0.488$ (CRV1 SE 0.126), estimated on the 79th–81st House sessions alone (Table 8). The calculation summarizes aggregate magnitude rather than assigning switching probabilities to individual legislators; entries are whole legislators, and totals sum the unrounded contributions. The first three roll calls precede Schlafly's regular *Spectrum* platform, which began on June 4, 1973. The May 1972 vote required a simple majority but all subsequent votes required a 3/5 majority.

Table 16: ANES Summary Statistics: Five-State Sample

	N	Mean	SD
Outcome			
Women's Rights sentiment	1,927	0.613	0.350
Women's Movement sentiment	1,466	0.467	0.265
Networks			
CBS TV Exposed	2,422	0.905	0.294
CBS FM Exposed	2,422	0.320	0.467
CBS AM Signal	2,422	0.000	1.000
County Controls			
JBS Member	2,422	0.588	0.492
Evangelical %	2,422	0.144	0.119
Catholic %	2,422	0.128	0.140
Mainline Protestant %	2,422	0.168	0.092
Respondent Controls			
Mainline Protestant	2,422	0.357	0.479
Evangelical	2,422	0.386	0.487
Catholic	2,422	0.149	0.356
Jewish	2,422	0.017	0.131
Non-Trad. Orthodox	2,422	0.012	0.107
Non-Christian/Jewish	2,422	0.004	0.064
Female	2,422	0.551	0.498

Notes: Sample is limited to FL, IL, MO, NC, and OK. Women's Rights sentiment is the equal-role scale, reverse-coded and mapped to $[0, 1]$, so higher values indicate more egalitarian sentiment. Women's Movement sentiment is the ANES thermometer divided by 100 after dropping special codes 98 and 99. CBS TV and FM exposure are binary strong signal indicators; CBS AM signal is normalized. Respondent reference categories are Male and No Religion.

Table 17: Relationships among ANES ERA-Related Outcomes

Outcome pair	Jointly observed waves	N	Pearson r	Spearman ρ
Panel A. Direct ERA comparisons				
ERA approval / Equal role	1976, 1978, 1980	679	0.377^{***}	0.389^{***}
ERA approval / Women's movement	1976, 1980	435	0.493^{***}	0.504^{***}
ERA approval / Rights of the accused	1976, 1978	482	0.174^{***}	0.168^{***}
Panel B. Related outcomes				
Equal role / Women's movement	1972, 1974, 1976, 1980, 1984	1,177	0.336^{***}	0.342^{***}
Equal role / Rights of the accused	1972, 1974, 1976, 1978	1,070	0.187^{***}	0.182^{***}
Women's movement / Rights of the accused	1970, 1972, 1974, 1976	945	0.101^{***}	0.103^{***}

Notes: Entries are pairwise-complete pooled correlations. Higher scores indicate greater support for the named outcome. Significance stars denote $^{*}p < 0.10$, $^{**}p < 0.05$, $^{***}p < 0.01$.

Table 18: Companion Outcomes by Stated ERA Support

Outcome	Oppose ERA mean	Support ERA mean	State × wave-adjusted supporter–opponent difference
Equal-role scale	0.476	0.744	0.275^{***}
	(284)	(395)	(0.025)
Women's-movement thermometer	0.346	0.591	0.253^{***}
	(177)	(258)	(0.018)
Rights of the accused	0.336	0.461	0.124^{***}
	(186)	(296)	(0.030)

Notes: Sample counts appear beneath the two group means; county-clustered standard errors appear beneath the state × wave-adjusted differences. All outcomes are coded so that higher respondent scores mean greater support for the named outcome. Significance stars denote $^{*}p < 0.10$, $^{**}p < 0.05$, $^{***}p < 0.01$.

Table 19: ANES Balance by Baseline CBS FM Coverage across 5 States

	Unexposed	Exposed	Difference
CBS TV coverage indicator	0.937	0.835	-0.103^{***}
County: JBS Member	0.492	0.792	0.300^{***}
County: Evangelical	0.183	0.061	-0.122^{***}
County: Catholic	0.090	0.208	0.118^{***}
County: Mainline Protestant	0.186	0.130	-0.057^{***}
Respondent: Mainline Protestant	0.358	0.355	−0.003
Respondent: Evangelical	0.412	0.329	−0.083
Respondent: Catholic	0.131	0.187	0.057
Respondent: Jewish	0.011	0.031	0.020^{**}
Respondent: Non-Trad. Orthodox	0.009	0.018	0.010^{*}
Respondent: Non-Christian/Non-Jewish	0.004	0.004	0.000
Respondent: Female	0.548	0.557	0.010

Notes: The table compares respondents in counties with and without baseline CBS FM coverage in the five pivotal ERA states: FL, IL, MO, NC, and OK. Differences report the raw exposed and unexposed difference in means. Raw outcome means by CBS FM exposure status are reported separately in Table 29. Significance stars are based on row-specific balance regressions that include state fixed effects: *** $p < 0.01$, ** $p < 0.05$, * $p < 0.1$.

Table 20: CBS Exposure from 1974 Onward on the Equal Role Scale

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)
Panel A: OLS				
CBS TV exposure	−0.129	0.417***	0.213	0.266
	(0.182)	(0.137)	(0.207)	(0.192)
CBS TV × Post ($t \geq 1974$)	0.267***	−0.322	−0.244	−0.285
	(0.066)	(0.227)	(0.204)	(0.209)
CBS FM exposure	0.177	0.250**	0.108	0.127
	(0.127)	(0.093)	(0.119)	(0.121)
CBS FM × Post ($t \geq 1974$)	−0.127	−0.236**	−0.203**	−0.213**
	(0.095)	(0.106)	(0.098)	(0.094)
Panel B: OLS				
CBS TV exposure	−0.142	0.268	0.186	0.222
	(0.138)	(0.208)	(0.223)	(0.204)
CBS TV × Post ($t \geq 1974$)	0.230***	−0.105	−0.063	−0.115
	(0.057)	(0.237)	(0.217)	(0.216)
CBS AM exposure	−0.039	−0.033	−0.026	−0.026
	(0.082)	(0.154)	(0.155)	(0.146)
CBS AM × Post ($t \geq 1974$)	−0.001	0.125	0.107	0.088
	(0.064)	(0.121)	(0.113)	(0.110)
Panel C: SiO_2 IV				
CBS TV exposure	−0.165	0.197	0.148	0.175
	(0.138)	(0.204)	(0.212)	(0.200)
CBS TV × Post ($t \geq 1974$)	0.241***	−0.121	−0.097	−0.120
	(0.049)	(0.264)	(0.250)	(0.248)
CBS AM exposure	0.021	0.150	0.011	0.046
	(0.099)	(0.095)	(0.137)	(0.127)
CBS AM × Post ($t \geq 1974$)	−0.121**	−0.073	−0.057	−0.067
	(0.051)	(0.046)	(0.042)	(0.040)
First-stage F	67.4	122.5	121.6	121.8
State × Year FE	No	Yes	Yes	Yes
Respondent Controls[b]	No	Yes	No	Yes
County Controls[c]	No	No	Yes	Yes
Observations	1,927	1,927	1,927	1,927

[a] Standard errors are in parentheses and clustered by county.

[b] Religion, Gender

[c] JBS Member (0/1), Religious composition (%)

Notes: Sample is limited to the five pivotal ERA states: FL, IL, MO, NC, and OK. Each panel reports both exposure-level coefficients and exposure interactions for $t \geq 1974$. AM signal is continuous; panels B and C are estimated jointly with CBS TV and AM. Strong signal thresholds: TV −55 dBm (47 CFR §73.683); FM −47 dBm (47 CFR §73.315). Outcomes are standardized such that coefficients are in standard deviations. Significance stars denote *** $p < 0.01$, ** $p < 0.05$, * $p < 0.1$.

Table 21: CBS Exposure from 1974 Onward on the Women's Movement Thermometer

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)
Panel A: OLS				
CBS TV exposure	−0.308	0.146*	0.557***	0.547***
	(0.268)	(0.081)	(0.125)	(0.122)
CBS TV × Post ($t \geq 1974$)	0.327***	−0.002	−0.024	0.012
	(0.092)	(0.149)	(0.124)	(0.140)
CBS FM exposure	−0.063	0.018	0.246*	0.253*
	(0.121)	(0.115)	(0.130)	(0.133)
CBS FM × Post ($t \geq 1974$)	0.223**	0.145	0.081	0.082
	(0.101)	(0.091)	(0.097)	(0.100)
Panel B: OLS				
CBS TV exposure	−0.391**	0.025	0.178	0.152
	(0.154)	(0.141)	(0.192)	(0.190)
CBS TV × Post ($t \geq 1974$)	0.410***	0.013	0.011	0.052
	(0.072)	(0.207)	(0.202)	(0.210)
CBS AM exposure	−0.092	−0.140	−0.174	−0.184
	(0.061)	(0.149)	(0.163)	(0.164)
CBS AM × Post ($t \geq 1974$)	−0.006	0.121	0.139	0.147
	(0.069)	(0.173)	(0.180)	(0.178)
Panel C: SiO_2 IV				
CBS TV exposure	−0.399**	0.169**	0.305**	0.290**
	(0.193)	(0.070)	(0.140)	(0.137)
CBS TV × Post ($t \geq 1974$)	0.411***	−0.160	−0.184	−0.152
	(0.072)	(0.124)	(0.119)	(0.133)
CBS AM exposure	−0.205**	−0.131	−0.007	0.040
	(0.081)	(0.115)	(0.100)	(0.093)
CBS AM × Post ($t \geq 1974$)	0.043	0.081	0.060	0.060
	(0.056)	(0.048)	(0.048)	(0.048)
First-stage F	83.0	152.7	151.2	151.1
State × Year FE	No	Yes	Yes	Yes
Respondent Controls[b]	No	Yes	No	Yes
County Controls[c]	No	No	Yes	Yes
Observations	1,466	1,466	1,466	1,466

Notes: The table uses the same sample, exposure definitions, controls, and standard-error clustering as Table 20. Significance stars denote *** $p < 0.01$, ** $p < 0.05$, * $p < 0.1$.

Table 22: ANES Full Specification Controls

	Women's Rights	Women's Movement
Panel A: TV + FM (OLS)		
CBS TV × Post ($t \geq 1974$)	−0.285	0.012
	(0.209)	(0.140)
CBS FM × Post ($t \geq 1974$)	−0.213**	0.082
	(0.094)	(0.100)
County: JBS Member	−0.085	−0.294***
	(0.068)	(0.080)
County: Catholic %	0.984***	0.190
	(0.302)	(0.309)
County: Evangelical %	−0.797***	−0.021
	(0.262)	(0.382)
County: Mainline Protestant %	−0.097	1.046***
	(0.236)	(0.270)
Resp: Mainline Protestant	−0.330***	−0.300***
	(0.086)	(0.083)
Resp: Evangelical	−0.540***	−0.223**
	(0.081)	(0.094)
Resp: Catholic	−0.365***	−0.095
	(0.109)	(0.115)
Resp: Jewish	−0.277***	0.146
	(0.077)	(0.091)
Resp: Non-Trad. Orthodox	−0.423*	−0.182
	(0.219)	(0.113)
Resp: Non-Christian/Jewish	0.007	0.179
	(0.259)	(0.370)
Resp: Female	−0.112**	−0.052
	(0.049)	(0.049)
Adjusted R^2	0.085	0.091
Panel B: TV + AM (SiO_2 IV)		
CBS AM (IV) × Post ($t \geq 1974$)	−0.067	0.060
	(0.040)	(0.048)
First-stage F	121.8	151.1
State × Year FE	Yes	Yes
Observations	1,927	1,466

Notes: Sample is limited to FL, IL, MO, NC, and OK. Coefficients are from the full specifications. Standard errors are in parentheses and clustered by county. Reference categories are No Religion and Male. Significance stars denote *** $p < 0.01$, ** $p < 0.05$, * $p < 0.1$.

Table 23: Sensitivity to Signal Threshold

	Strong[a]	Medium[b]	Weak[c]
Equal Role Scale			
CBS TV × Post ($t \geq 1974$)	−0.182	—	—
	(0.211)		
CBS FM × Post ($t \geq 1974$)	−0.172**	−0.192**	−0.017
	(0.081)	(0.081)	(0.155)
CBS AM (IV) × Post ($t \geq 1974$)	−0.076**	—	—
	(0.034)		
First-stage F	146.3	—	—
Women's Movement Thermometer			
CBS TV × Post ($t \geq 1974$)	−0.066	—	—
	(0.138)		
CBS FM × Post ($t \geq 1974$)	0.107	0.102	−0.404***
	(0.095)	(0.096)	(0.099)
CBS AM (IV) × Post ($t \geq 1974$)	0.052	—	—
	(0.045)		
First-stage F	176.0	—	—
State × Year FE	Yes	Yes	Yes
Respondent Controls	Yes	Yes	Yes
County Controls	Yes	Yes	Yes

[a] **Strong** TV: −55 dBm (Robust reception; aligns with High VHF Grade B, 56 dBu, 47 CFR §73.683); FM: −47 dBm (FM city grade contour, 70 dBu, 47 CFR §73.315)

[b] **Medium** TV: −63 dBm (Primary service boundary; aligns with Low VHF Grade B, 47 dBu, 47 CFR §73.683); FM: −57 dBm (FM service contour, 60 dBu, 47 CFR §73.213)

[c] **Weak** TV: −75 dBm (Fringe reception limit); FM: −77 dBm (FM co-channel interfering contour, 40 dBu, 47 CFR §73.213)

Notes: Sample is limited to FL, IL, MO, NC, and OK. Each TV/FM coefficient comes from a separate full-control model for that channel–threshold pair; AM is an AM-only IV model using continuous signal instrumented with SiO_2. County-clustered standard errors appear in parentheses. Outcome samples vary with ANES question availability. Near-universal TV coverage makes some terms collinear and shown as —. The weak-FM thermometer sign reversal is treated as threshold instability. Significance stars denote *** $p < 0.01$, ** $p < 0.05$, * $p < 0.1$.

Table 24: Wild-Cluster Inference for the Main ANES Treatments

Outcome	Channel	Estimate (CRV1 SE)	WCR-S p	WCR-C p	Obs. (counties)
Equal-role scale	CBS TV	−0.285 (0.209)	0.309	0.306	1,927 (32)
	CBS FM	−0.213** (0.094)	0.047	0.048	
	CBS AM IV	−0.067 (0.040)	0.240	0.197	
Women's-movement thermometer	CBS TV	0.012 (0.140)	0.963	0.955	1,466 (31)
	CBS FM	0.082 (0.100)	0.531	0.473	
	CBS AM IV	0.060 (0.048)	0.259	0.178	
Rights of the accused	CBS TV	−0.089 (0.077)	0.545	0.699	1,390 (26)
	CBS FM	−0.207*** (0.059)	0.015	0.011	
	CBS AM IV	−0.067* (0.035)	0.133	0.106	

Notes: TV and FM use the joint TV+FM specification; AM uses the joint TV+AM IV specification. All models include state-by-wave fixed effects and full county and respondent controls. WCR-S is primary and uses leave-one-county score adjustments; WCR-C uses ordinary restricted scores. AM values are weak-IV-robust wild Anderson–Rubin p-values. Both versions are reported because some media cells contain few county clusters. Bootstrap tests use 9,999 Rademacher draws. Significance stars use conventional cluster-t inference based on the displayed CRV1 standard errors; WCR and Anderson–Rubin p-values are reported separately: $^{*}p < 0.10$, $^{**}p < 0.05$, $^{***}p < 0.01$.

Table 25: ANES Pre-Treatment and Bundle-Timing Checks

Check	Outcome and window	Channel	Estimate (CRV1 SE)	WCR-S p	WCR-C p	Obs. (counties)
Pre-treatment levels	Equal role (1972)	CBS TV	0.400 (0.383)	0.522	0.435	409 (19)
		CBS FM	0.142 (0.201)	0.598	0.577	
		CBS AM IV	0.095 (0.150)	0.676	0.645	
	Women's movement (1970–72)	CBS TV	0.938*** (0.212)	0.035	0.020	538 (20)
		CBS FM	0.444** (0.174)	0.132	0.129	
		CBS AM IV	0.260* (0.138)	0.310	0.344	
	Rights of the accused (1970–72)	CBS TV	0.356 (0.227)	0.512	0.335	540 (20)
		CBS FM	0.251** (0.107)	0.220	0.220	
		CBS AM IV	0.113 (0.096)	0.483	0.510	
Pre-period change	Women's movement (exposure × 1972)	CBS TV	0.685*** (0.154)	0.001	0.247	538 (20)
		CBS FM	0.039 (0.135)	0.784	0.814	
		CBS AM IV	−0.074 (0.084)	0.424	0.437	
	Rights of the accused (exposure × 1972)	CBS TV	0.162 (0.196)	0.568	0.768	540 (20)
		CBS FM	0.119 (0.218)	0.743	0.694	
		CBS AM IV	−0.025 (0.111)	0.912	0.907	
Bundle timing	Rights of the accused (1974 pre-bundle)	CBS TV	−0.302 (0.348)	0.731	0.729	1,390 (26)
		CBS FM	−0.167 (0.141)	0.340	0.316	
	Rights of the accused (1976+ frame-aligned)	CBS TV	−0.042 (0.044)	0.525	0.357	1,390 (26)
		CBS FM	−0.228*** (0.049)	0.003	0.003	
	Rights of the accused (1976+ minus 1974)	CBS TV	0.260 (0.356)	0.702	0.705	1,390 (26)
		CBS FM	−0.061 (0.141)	0.696	0.701	

Notes: Estimates appear above county-clustered CRV1 standard errors; the final column stacks observations over county clusters. TV and FM use the joint TV+FM model; AM uses joint TV+AM IV with Anderson–Rubin wild tests. The level checks are pre-treatment screens, not pretrends. Only the 1970–72 change is available, and equal role has one pre-treatment wave; the women's-movement TV change has only two untreated-TV counties. The bundle panel separates 1974, 1976+, and their difference for rights of the accused. Models include state-by-wave fixed effects, full controls, and 9,999 Rademacher draws. Significance stars use conventional cluster-t inference based on the displayed CRV1 standard errors; WCR and Anderson–Rubin p-values are reported separately: $^{*}p < 0.10$, $^{**}p < 0.05$, $^{***}p < 0.01$.

Table 26: Robustness and Scope Outcomes

		CBS TV × Post				CBS FM × Post						
Sample	Outcome	β	(SE)	WCR-S p	WCR-C p	β	(SE)	WCR-S p	WCR-C p	N	Counties	States
Lower 48	Equal Role	−0.064	(0.067)	0.453	0.420	−0.053	(0.068)	0.533	0.520	12,348	223	41
	Women's Movement Th.	0.026	(0.069)	0.766	0.757	0.043	(0.073)	0.662	0.640	9,647	226	41
	Abortion	0.153	(0.140)	0.474	0.460	−0.064	(0.103)	0.616	0.598	4,458	155	40
	Rights of Accused	−0.144**	(0.057)	0.058	0.045	−0.135***	(0.046)	0.010	0.009	8,172	168	40
	Aid to Blacks	−0.047	(0.062)	0.542	0.514	−0.038	(0.070)	0.643	0.638	12,757	234	41
	Police Th.	0.076	(0.060)	0.307	0.268	−0.075	(0.058)	0.296	0.265	6,853	130	37
	Black Militants Th.	−0.052	(0.062)	0.497	0.465	−0.019	(0.068)	0.815	0.817	9,643	226	41
	Civil Rights Leaders Th.	−0.060	(0.070)	0.496	0.469	−0.019	(0.084)	0.854	0.849	9,684	226	41
	Liberals Th.	−0.029	(0.079)	0.810	0.777	−0.054	(0.095)	0.657	0.638	10,178	233	41
	Conservatives Th.	−0.025	(0.063)	0.752	0.733	0.035	(0.079)	0.724	0.703	10,345	233	41
	Military Th.	0.087	(0.057)	0.212	0.196	0.020	(0.054)	0.752	0.743	9,899	226	41
Nonratifying	Equal Role	−0.139	(0.128)	0.477	0.462	−0.120	(0.086)	0.284	0.261	3,747	63	14
	Women's Movement Th.	0.030	(0.074)	0.742	0.708	0.048	(0.085)	0.638	0.618	2,874	63	14
	Abortion	−0.364***	(0.114)	0.045	0.021	−0.001	(0.103)	0.995	0.994	1,541	48	14
	Rights of Accused	−0.201*	(0.115)	0.308	0.357	−0.164***	(0.053)	0.011	0.012	2,635	51	14
	Aid to Blacks	−0.126	(0.115)	0.452	0.450	0.042	(0.119)	0.749	0.753	3,910	66	14
	Police Th.	0.172	(0.108)	0.242	0.236	0.006	(0.092)	0.958	0.955	2,277	39	14
	Black Militants Th.	0.075	(0.076)	0.360	0.349	0.112	(0.093)	0.339	0.320	2,927	63	14
	Civil Rights Leaders Th.	−0.143	(0.102)	0.342	0.382	0.005	(0.114)	0.970	0.972	2,922	63	14
	Liberals Th.	0.124	(0.242)	0.828	0.743	−0.075	(0.143)	0.667	0.664	3,067	65	14
	Conservatives Th.	0.061	(0.127)	0.699	0.697	0.083	(0.130)	0.622	0.613	3,129	65	14
	Military Th.	0.163*	(0.082)	0.131	0.151	−0.023	(0.077)	0.805	0.800	2,993	63	14
Pivotal 5	Equal Role	−0.285	(0.209)	0.309	0.306	−0.213**	(0.094)	0.047	0.048	1,927	32	5
	Women's Movement Th.	0.012	(0.140)	0.963	0.955	0.082	(0.100)	0.531	0.473	1,466	31	5
	Abortion	−0.016	(0.174)	0.951	0.946	−0.034	(0.137)	0.808	0.810	723	25	5
	Rights of Accused	−0.089	(0.077)	0.545	0.699	−0.207***	(0.059)	0.015	0.011	1,390	26	5
	Aid to Blacks	−0.176*	(0.099)	0.337	0.308	0.016	(0.148)	0.923	0.915	2,055	33	5
	Police Th.	0.242***	(0.077)	0.192	0.199	0.022	(0.109)	0.852	0.853	1,131	20	5
	Black Militants Th.	0.165	(0.145)	0.349	0.346	0.167	(0.125)	0.308	0.282	1,488	31	5
	Civil Rights Leaders Th.	−0.184	(0.212)	0.733	0.791	0.029	(0.160)	0.900	0.899	1,474	31	5
	Liberals Th.	−0.365***	(0.129)	0.165	0.182	−0.094	(0.180)	0.687	0.671	1,620	32	5
	Conservatives Th.	0.271	(0.194)	0.511	0.650	0.160	(0.169)	0.510	0.475	1,653	32	5
	Military Th.	0.201**	(0.094)	0.299	0.448	0.040	(0.091)	0.741	0.735	1,522	31	5

Notes: Coefficients are exposure interactions for $t \geq 1974$ from FE+All DiD models with state-by-year fixed effects and respondent and county controls. Each outcome is standardized separately within each displayed sample. Parentheses report county-clustered CRV1 standard errors. "Th." denotes a feeling thermometer. AM is excluded. Pivotal states are FL, IL, MO, NC, and OK; the observed non-ratifying sample adds AL, AR, AZ, GA, LA, MS, SC, UT, and VA. Nevada, the remaining non-ratifying state, is unavailable because it has no county-geocoded observations in the analysis waves. The lower-48 sample contains the 41 states with county-geocoded observations (ID, MT, ND, NM, NV, RI, and VT are unavailable). Samples vary where ANES did not field an outcome. The rights-of-accused interaction pools 1974 with 1976+; Table 25 separates them. WCR-S (type 31) and WCR-C (type 11) are two-sided, null-imposed wild-cluster-bootstrap p-values from 9,999 Rademacher draws using Table 24's separate-test procedure, with the seed reset for each coefficient. WCR-S is primary and WCR-C is a sensitivity check; these are pointwise, not multiplicity-adjusted, p-values. Stars use conventional cluster-t inference based on the displayed CRV1 standard errors: $^{*}p < 0.10$, $^{**}p < 0.05$, $^{***}p < 0.01$.

Table 27: CBS TV/FM & Cross-Sectional State ERA Referenda "Yes" Share

	Strong	Medium	Weak
CBS TV exposure	0.021**	0.013	−0.002
	(0.009)	(0.009)	(0.012)
CBS FM exposure	−0.016	−0.001	−0.014
	(0.023)	(0.018)	(0.011)
State fixed effects	Yes	Yes	Yes
County controls	Yes	Yes	Yes
Observations	202	202	202

Notes: The dependent variable is county-level Yes vote share in state ERA referenda, so positive coefficients indicate greater pro-ERA support. The pooled sample includes New Jersey, Florida, Iowa, and Maine. CBS TV and CBS FM are binary exposure indicators. Columns vary the exposure threshold; the strong-threshold column is the preferred specification. County controls include pre-treatment JBS member presence and evangelical, Catholic, and mainline Protestant population shares. Standard errors are clustered by county. Significance stars denote $^{*}p < 0.10$, $^{**}p < 0.05$, $^{***}p < 0.01$.

Table 28: Cross-Sectional Robustness and Scope Outcomes by Sample

		CBS TV exposure				CBS FM exposure						
Sample	Outcome	β	(SE)	WCR-S p	WCR-C p	β	(SE)	WCR-S p	WCR-C p	N	Counties	States
Lower 48	Equal Role	0.134^{***}	(0.035)	0.004	0.002	0.007	(0.032)	0.860	0.859	12,348	223	41
	Women's Movement Th.	0.093^{*}	(0.050)	0.185	0.153	0.078	(0.049)	0.241	0.223	9,647	226	41
	Abortion	0.091	(0.061)	0.268	0.231	0.065	(0.053)	0.316	0.282	4,458	155	40
	Rights of Accused	0.097^{*}	(0.053)	0.171	0.133	0.008	(0.052)	0.913	0.906	8,172	168	40
	Aid to Blacks	0.147^{***}	(0.046)	0.021	0.012	0.102^{**}	(0.041)	0.042	0.041	12,757	234	41
	Police Th.	-0.131^{***}	(0.046)	0.037	0.018	-0.123^{**}	(0.062)	0.137	0.111	6,853	130	37
	Black Militants Th.	0.076	(0.051)	0.256	0.220	0.064	(0.053)	0.342	0.321	9,643	226	41
	Civil Rights Leaders Th.	0.160^{***}	(0.055)	0.028	0.020	-0.005	(0.058)	0.949	0.945	9,684	226	41
	Liberals Th.	0.058	(0.051)	0.429	0.382	0.073	(0.054)	0.307	0.282	10,178	233	41
	Conservatives Th.	-0.061^{*}	(0.032)	0.126	0.104	0.014	(0.035)	0.734	0.723	10,345	233	41
	Military Th.	-0.084^{**}	(0.034)	0.055	0.038	-0.103^{**}	(0.051)	0.105	0.089	9,899	226	41
	ERA Support†	0.085	(0.052)	0.230	0.201	0.023	(0.041)	0.649	0.630	4,541	155	40
Nonratifying	Equal Role	0.217^{***}	(0.051)	0.003	0.001	0.064	(0.057)	0.373	0.360	3,747	63	14
	Women's Movement Th.	0.060	(0.138)	0.804	0.775	0.186^{**}	(0.078)	0.139	0.122	2,874	63	14
	Abortion	0.276^{*}	(0.145)	0.288	0.249	0.138	(0.087)	0.276	0.244	1,541	48	14
	Rights of Accused	0.306^{**}	(0.141)	0.249	0.243	0.143^{**}	(0.054)	0.057	0.059	2,635	51	14
	Aid to Blacks	0.223^{*}	(0.116)	0.214	0.203	0.062	(0.061)	0.388	0.408	3,910	66	14
	Police Th.	-0.281^{**}	(0.104)	0.155	0.091	-0.077	(0.080)	0.469	0.489	2,277	39	14
	Black Militants Th.	0.118	(0.153)	0.566	0.532	-0.018	(0.081)	0.866	0.861	2,927	63	14
	Civil Rights Leaders Th.	0.179	(0.152)	0.446	0.398	-0.055	(0.094)	0.649	0.651	2,922	63	14
	Liberals Th.	0.109	(0.181)	0.720	0.703	0.123	(0.087)	0.326	0.301	3,067	65	14
	Conservatives Th.	-0.145^{**}	(0.073)	0.191	0.176	0.024	(0.047)	0.709	0.691	3,129	65	14
	Military Th.	-0.262^{***}	(0.066)	0.048	0.019	0.000	(0.071)	0.999	0.999	2,993	63	14
	ERA Support†	0.018	(0.171)	0.947	0.943	0.026	(0.061)	0.833	0.814	1,368	48	14
Pivotal 5	Equal Role	0.050	(0.092)	0.727	0.654	-0.042	(0.066)	0.630	0.607	1,927	32	5
	Women's Movement Th.	0.563^{***}	(0.131)	0.068	0.015	0.305^{***}	(0.100)	0.206	0.175	1,466	31	5
	Abortion	-0.366^{**}	(0.163)	0.213	0.140	-0.018	(0.103)	0.905	0.894	723	25	5
	Rights of Accused	0.291^{*}	(0.149)	0.364	0.245	0.117	(0.090)	0.447	0.455	1,390	26	5
	Aid to Blacks	0.058	(0.101)	0.693	0.636	0.002	(0.072)	0.986	0.986	2,055	33	5
	Police Th.	0.007	(0.267)	0.985	0.985	0.151^{*}	(0.081)	0.257	0.297	1,131	20	5
	Black Militants Th.	0.318^{*}	(0.175)	0.270	0.161	0.062	(0.136)	0.771	0.752	1,488	31	5
	Civil Rights Leaders Th.	0.248	(0.157)	0.368	0.229	-0.042	(0.130)	0.804	0.790	1,474	31	5
	Liberals Th.	0.607^{***}	(0.198)	0.177	0.099	0.220^{*}	(0.118)	0.319	0.320	1,620	32	5
	Conservatives Th.	0.112	(0.108)	0.469	0.372	0.080	(0.064)	0.387	0.330	1,653	32	5
	Military Th.	-0.082	(0.134)	0.700	0.607	0.086	(0.078)	0.504	0.440	1,522	31	5
	ERA Support†	-0.028	(0.097)	0.833	0.816	-0.042	(0.065)	0.681	0.651	723	25	5

Notes: Coefficients come from cross-sectional FE+All models with no Post interaction and the same fixed effects and controls. Each outcome is standardized separately within each displayed sample. Parentheses report county-clustered CRV1 standard errors. AM is excluded. Sample definitions and availability follow Table 26. † ERA Support is observed only in 1976, 1978, and 1980. WCR-S (type 31) and WCR-C (type 11) are two-sided, null-imposed wild-cluster-bootstrap p-values from 9,999 Rademacher draws using Table 24's separate-test procedure, with the seed reset for each coefficient. WCR-S is primary and WCR-C is a sensitivity check; these are pointwise, not multiplicity-adjusted, p-values. Stars use conventional cluster-t inference based on the displayed CRV1 standard errors: $^{*}p < 0.10$, $^{**}p < 0.05$, $^{***}p < 0.01$.

Table 29: ANES Outcome Raw Means by CBS FM Exposure Status

Year	FM exposed	FM unexposed	Difference	FL	IL	MO	NC	OK	Total	Dropped
Panel A. Women's Rights (Equal Role Scale)										
1972	0.603	0.514	0.089**	75	127	70	118	19	409	22
1974	0.576	0.557	0.020	39	77	42	73	13	244	17
1976	0.607	0.576	0.032	64	96	51	62	8	281	106
1978	0.670	0.626	0.044	108	78	38	57	56	337	12
1980	0.655	0.640	0.015	62	52	24	30	27	195	55
1982	0.616	0.698	−0.083*	70	58	42	61	19	250	14
1984	0.712	0.694	0.018	68	59	29	55	0	211	28
Total	**0.629**	**0.606**	**0.024**	**486**	**547**	**296**	**456**	**142**	**1,927**	**254**
Panel B. Women's Movement Thermometer										
1970	0.362	0.375	−0.012	52	46	51	51	16	216	25
1972	0.423	0.407	0.017	57	94	51	106	14	322	109
1974	0.521	0.490	0.031	40	77	39	70	14	240	21
1976	0.535	0.476	0.060**	64	94	51	68	8	285	102
1980	0.505	0.471	0.034	63	60	26	29	27	205	45
1984	0.571	0.559	0.012	68	51	29	50	0	198	41
Total	**0.480**	**0.460**	**0.020**	**344**	**422**	**247**	**374**	**79**	**1,466**	**343**
Panel C. Rights of Accused										
1970	0.456	0.399	0.057	50	50	50	52	13	215	26
1972	0.519	0.430	0.089**	61	104	52	95	13	325	106
1974	0.420	0.415	0.005	39	69	37	63	12	220	41
1976	0.440	0.421	0.019	70	113	48	77	19	327	60
1978	0.396	0.388	0.007	104	71	31	44	53	303	46
Total	**0.450**	**0.412**	**0.039***	**324**	**407**	**218**	**331**	**110**	**1,390**	**279**
Panel D. ERA Support†										
1976	0.700	0.651	0.049	62	85	46	65	11	269	118
1978	0.641	0.542	0.099	91	65	25	41	46	268	81
1980	0.474	0.481	−0.007	60	52	25	28	21	186	64
Total	**0.619**	**0.567**	**0.052**	**213**	**202**	**96**	**134**	**78**	**723**	**263**

Notes: Entries are respondent-level raw means by baseline 1971 CBS FM coverage in FL, IL, MO, NC, and OK. Differences are exposed minus unexposed; state columns give valid counts, and Dropped gives excluded special-code or missing responses. These comparisons are descriptive, not causal. † ERA Support is observed only after treatment and is not used as a main DiD outcome. Significance stars use Welch tests and denote * $p < 0.10$, ** $p < 0.05$, *** $p < 0.01$.

Table 30: ANES TV/FM Exposure Composition by Question and Signal Threshold

		Counties		Respondents	
Network	Threshold	Unexposed	Exposed	Unexposed	Exposed
Panel A. Equal Role Scale					
CBS FM	**Strong (−47 dBm)**	24 (75.0%)	8 (25.0%)	1,321 (68.6%)	606 (31.4%)
	Medium (−57 dBm)	21 (65.6%)	11 (34.4%)	1,297 (67.3%)	630 (32.7%)
	Weak (−77 dBm)	11 (34.4%)	21 (65.6%)	595 (30.9%)	1,332 (69.1%)
CBS TV	**Strong (−55 dBm)**	3 (9.4%)	29 (90.6%)	181 (9.4%)	1,746 (90.6%)
Panel B. Women's Movement Thermometer					
CBS FM	**Strong (−47 dBm)**	23 (74.2%)	8 (25.8%)	970 (66.2%)	496 (33.8%)
	Medium (−57 dBm)	22 (71.0%)	9 (29.0%)	959 (65.4%)	507 (34.6%)
	Weak (−77 dBm)	11 (35.5%)	20 (64.5%)	415 (28.3%)	1,051 (71.7%)
CBS TV	**Strong (−55 dBm)**	3 (9.7%)	28 (90.3%)	122 (8.3%)	1,344 (91.7%)
Panel C. Rights of the Accused Scale					
CBS FM	**Strong (−47 dBm)**	19 (73.1%)	7 (26.9%)	916 (65.9%)	474 (34.1%)
	Medium (−57 dBm)	18 (69.2%)	8 (30.8%)	910 (65.5%)	480 (34.5%)
	Weak (−77 dBm)	9 (34.6%)	17 (65.4%)	391 (28.1%)	999 (71.9%)
CBS TV	**Strong (−55 dBm)**	2 (7.7%)	24 (92.3%)	96 (6.9%)	1,294 (93.1%)
Panel D. ERA Support†					
CBS FM	**Strong (−47 dBm)**	18 (72.0%)	7 (28.0%)	508 (70.3%)	215 (29.7%)
	Medium (−57 dBm)	17 (68.0%)	8 (32.0%)	498 (68.9%)	225 (31.1%)
	Weak (−77 dBm)	9 (36.0%)	16 (64.0%)	250 (34.6%)	473 (65.4%)
CBS TV	**Strong (−55 dBm)**	2 (8.0%)	23 (92.0%)	60 (8.3%)	663 (91.7%)

Notes: Cells report counts and within-sample percentages after drops for the outcome, exposure, or included controls. FM rows correspond to separate strong, medium, and weak threshold regressions; near-universal TV coverage precludes comparable medium and weak rows. AM uses a continuous instrumented signal rather than a threshold contrast. The ERA-support timing is defined in Table 29.

Table 31: Data Sources

Source	Coverage	Records	Use
Panel A: Digitized Data			
Treatment			
1972–73 Television Factbook	National (1972)	All TV stations	Tower parameters
1972 Broadcasting Yearbook	National (1971)	CBS AM/FM stations	Tower parameters
CBS schedule/transcript records[a]	1973–75	3 notices; 14 appearances	Platform timing
Outcomes			
IL General Assembly roll calls[b]	1972–1980	ERA and compensation votes	Vote outcomes / comparison outcome
IL General Assembly debates[c]	1972–1980	15 dates; 401 speeches (281 House, 120 Senate)	Similarity
P. Schlafly Report corpus	1972–1980	81 ERA issues; 75 temporally eligible	Similarity
State ERA referendum returns[f]	1975–1984	203 county returns	Table 27
Controls			
IL Blue Books	1972–1980	Legislator bios	Legislator controls
IL Official Vote, 1964	State	County/town/ward returns	Goldwater % control
IL Official Vote, 1970	State	County/town/ward returns	Constitution % control
John Birch Society membership[d]	1964–1974	Dues paid before 1972	Conservative network control
Maps			
IL General Assembly district plans	77th House, 77th Senate, 78th+ common	3 historical map configurations	Legislative boundaries
Panel B: Existing Data			
Outcome			
American National Election Studies (ANES)	1970–1984	Individual responses	Public opinion poll
Controls			
Association of Religion Data Archives (ARDA)	1971	County church membership	Religious composition
Maps			
USGS National Elevation Dataset	National	30m resolution	Quasi-random FM/TV variation
FCC Ground Conductivity (M3)	National	Conductivity (S/m)	Endogenous AM soil
USGS Geochemical Survey[e]	National	SiO_2 concentration	AM instrumental
US counties	National	GIS shapefile	County boundaries

Notes: [a] Newspaper notices date the June 1973 schedule; reviewed CBS *Morning News* microfilm/fiches cover 1974–75 and contain 14 *Spectrum* appearances in 1974. Radio scripts are unavailable. [b] ERA House votes were digitized from a thirteen-newspaper Illinois corpus on Newspapers.com; the replication documentation lists each title. [c] Debates were transcribed from Illinois General Assembly records mandated by Article IV of the 1970 state constitution. [d] The recovered 1964–74 JBS lists and dues cards are incomplete, likely overrepresent prominent members, and were geocoded to counties and legislative districts. [e] The USGS SiO_2 raster supplies the geochemical instrument for soil-conductivity-driven AM signal variation. [f] Referendum returns come from official state sources (Florida Department of State, Division of Elections 1978; Iowa Secretary of State 1980; New Jersey Secretary of State 1975; State of Maine 1984); New York is omitted because no public county return was located, and the Maine file lacks six York County municipalities.

Table 32: Signal Propagation Model Parameters

Parameter	Description	TV	FM	AM
Propagation Model				
Model	Propagation engine	ITM[a]	ITM[a]	LFMF[b]
Mode	Operational mode	Point-to-Point	Area Prediction	Millington[c]
Antenna & Siting				
h_r	Receiver height (m)	9.0	2.0	0.0[d]
Gain	Receiver antenna gain (dBi)	0.0	−4.0	—
Polarization	Antenna polarization	Horizontal (0)	Vertical (1)	Vertical
TX Siting	Transmitter siting criteria	—	Careful (1)	—
RX Siting	Receiver siting criteria	—	Random (0)	—
Environment & Climate				
N_s	Surface refractivity (N-units)	301.0	301.0	301.0
Climate	Climate code	5	5	—
ϵ	Ground relative permittivity	15.0	15.0	FCC M3[e]
σ	Ground conductivity (S/m)	0.005	0.005	FCC M3[e]
Statistical Reliability				
mdvar	Mode of variability	Broadcast (3)	Mobile (2)	—
Time	Time availability (%)	50.0	50.0	—
Location	Location availability (%)	50.0	50.0	—
Situation	Situation confidence (%)	50.0	50.0	—
Terrain / Path Data				
Resolution	Elevation profile points	1000	1000	—
Terrain radius	Δh computation radius (km)	—	30	—
Path segments	Millington path segments	—	—	50
Max distance	Maximum TX–RX distance (km)	—	—	800

[a] Irregular Terrain Model (Longley–Rice); parameters from Hufford, Longley, and Kissick 1982. FM receiver nets to −4.0 dBi (−3.0 dBi mobile antenna whip −1.0 dB line losses). TV receiver nets to 0 dBi (+2.0 dBi antenna gain −2.0 dB line losses). Siting criteria is a qualitative description (0, 1, or 2) of the care taken to choose a terminal site specifically to improve radio reception.

[b] LFMF models AM ground-wave attenuation using soil conductivity along the path.

[c] The Millington method averages forward and reverse field strength over mixed-conductivity paths; segment values come from the FCC M3 map or the SiO_2 raster for the IV.

[d] LFMF receiver height fixed at ground level (0 m). Transmitter height uses station records, defaulting to 60 m if missing or invalid (<10 m), and dynamically capped at 0.7λ per LFMF specifications.

[e] FCC M3 supplies spatially varying σ and ϵ. The residualized instrument is LFMF(σ from SiO_2) − LFMF($\sigma = 0.005$).

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